Pivotal Issues in Korea-Japan-U.S. Relations

Perspectives from Emerging Leaders
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Edited by Arthur Alexander
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation is a 501(c)3 organization that promotes understanding and cooperation in U.S.-Asia relations. The Foundation was established in 1983 to honor Mike Mansfield (1903–2001), a revered public servant, statesman and diplomat who played a pivotal role in many of the key domestic and international issues of the 20th century as U.S. congressman from Montana, Senate majority leader and finally as U.S. ambassador to Japan. Maureen and Mike Mansfield’s values, ideals and vision for U.S.-Asia relations continue through the Foundation’s exchanges, dialogues, research and educational programs, which create networks among U.S. and Asian leaders, explore the underlying issues influencing public policies, and increase awareness about the nations and peoples of Asia. The Foundation has offices in Washington, D.C.; Tokyo, Japan; and Missoula, Montana.
About the Program

Mansfield Foundation Emerging Leaders in Northeast Asia Scholars Program
The Mansfield Foundation, in cooperation with the Korea Foundation, launched the Mansfield Foundation Emerging Leaders in Northeast Asia Scholars Program in 2015 to strengthen the network between Korea and Japan scholars and to promote collaboration on interests the United States, Korea, and Japan share. Participants were selected from two Mansfield Foundation programs: the U.S.-Korea Scholar-Policymaker Nexus and U.S.-Japan Network for the Future.

The participants convened for the first time at an October 2015 three-day retreat in Missoula, Montana. There they engaged in discussion sessions on Japan-Korea relations and U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia with experts from the U.S., Japan, and Korea, and participated in a trilateral crisis management scenario. In May 2016, program participants gathered again for a series of meetings in Seoul and Jeju, South Korea on the sidelines of the Jeju Forum. In Seoul, participants met with policymakers, Korean scholars, and opinion leaders from the Blue House, Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Assembly, and Seoul National University. The scholars then traveled to Jeju, where they participated in Jeju Forum events and led a public discussion session.

The Korea Foundation
The Korea Foundation (KF) was established in 1991 to promote awareness and understanding of Korea and to enhance goodwill and friendship among the international community through its cultural, academic and intellectual exchange activities and programs. As a leading organization of Korea’s international exchange and public diplomacy initiative, some of its major works include: providing support for Korean studies overseas; organizing/supporting international forums; assisting research institutions/think tanks around the world in their research, conferences and publications; promoting exchanges of performing arts and exhibitions; and establishing Korean galleries in museums abroad. Currently, the Korea Foundation has 7 overseas branches in major cities, which are Washington D.C., Los Angeles, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, Berlin, and Hanoi.
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Perhaps no one word has been used more frequently and with less agreed definition to describe President Barack Obama’s approach to Asia than “pivot.” Rolled out with much fanfare by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her Foreign Policy article “America’s Pacific Century” in November 2011, the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” was actually conceived in the earliest days of the 2008 presidential campaign. Recognizing that the balance of U.S. strategic interests had long before shifted from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific Rim, members of Obama’s foreign policy team began to craft an Asia strategy based on three pillars: reaffirming and updating existing alliances, especially with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and New Zealand; developing deeper security and economic ties with new partners such as India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Myanmar; and strengthening multilateral institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its affiliated dialogues (such as the ASEAN Regional Forum) while crafting a high-quality free trade agreement (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) to deepen regional integration.

The strategic objective of the pivot to Asia is to buttress the rules-based international liberal order upon which U.S. security and prosperity depend. One obvious threat to that order is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), with its pursuit of nuclear weapons and abysmal human rights record. Rebalancing U.S. military and economic interests brings greater resources to bear on the North Korea challenge, and perhaps will facilitate a peaceful solution. Senior policymakers also understand, but rarely say publicly, that China’s rise poses another serious challenge to the international order. Advocates for the pivot believe that engaging China from a position of strength—with allies at our side—will be much more effective than approaching Beijing alone.
To ensure the success of the pivot, Secretary Clinton and her East Asia policy architect, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, knew they had to strengthen the links among the allies that form the United States’ “hub and spoke” network, especially the ties between the ROK and Japan. Relations between Seoul and Tokyo have been strained in recent years, fraught with mistrust and plagued not only by a nagging territorial dispute, but also by an old human rights grievance—the “comfort women” issue—made new through the actions and statements of politicians and civil society leaders in both countries. Improving the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo quickly became a high priority for the Obama administration. Despite recent progress, most notably the landmark agreement on the comfort women issue in late 2015, relations between Seoul and Tokyo remain storm-tossed, much as East Asia’s overall dynamic remains fluid.

In the era of globalization, with transnational challenges like terrorism, nonproliferation, and climate change dominating the international agenda, bilateral alliances remain vital. But they must often engage multilaterally to get things done. For Washington, maintaining a healthy trilateral ROK-Japan-U.S. relationship has become essential, not only to manage the threat posed by North Korea, but also to encourage China to abide by international norms.

As part of its mission to promote understanding and cooperation between the United States and its Pacific partners, in 2015 the Mansfield Foundation, with generous support from the Korea Foundation, recruited a team of outstanding young U.S. scholars on Northeast Asia. Our purpose was to weave them into a network and connect them to government policymakers who are attempting to traverse the treacherous seas that
both separate and link the United States, Korea, and Japan. We knew that U.S. policymakers could benefit from outside expertise and analysis.

We brought the scholars together in Missoula, Seoul, Jeju, and Washington to meet with officials and counterparts who share their concerns and are working to bridge the Pacific and promote collaboration among the peoples of Korea, Japan, and the United States. Under the guidance of senior advisers Lee Sang-hyun (Sejong Institute), John Merrill (U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies), Junya Nishino (Keio University), Park Cheol-hee (Seoul National University), Scott Snyder (Council on Foreign Relations), and Yoshihide Soeya (Keio University), these emerging leaders were encouraged to think creatively about the challenges of forging a more cohesive community in Northeast Asia. We asked them to examine issues that impede closer cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo, hoping that their work could help policymakers bridge the divide.

Presented here are nine thought-provoking essays by the members of the Mansfield Foundation’s Emerging Leaders in Northeast Asia Scholars Program. At this pivotal moment, as a new U.S. president prepares to take the oath of office, and as Seoul prepares to elect a successor to President Park Geun-hye, we are proud to present their views. We hope in the years ahead that these bright scholars will serve as beacons for those navigating East Asia’s fluid dynamics.

Frank Jannuzi
President and CEO, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Washington, D.C.
January 19, 2017
Executive Summary

Japan and South Korea’s landmark agreement on the comfort women issue in late 2015 demonstrated the two capitals’ ability to compromise on a highly contentious historical issue. Despite doubts and criticism, implementation of the deal has progressed, allowing the two countries’ military to explore further trilateral security cooperation with the United States. With uncertainty about the strength of both Japan and South Korea’s U.S. alliances in the years ahead, the danger of a regional arms race and destabilizing geopolitical realignment looms large. However, an opportunity exists for Seoul and Tokyo to reinforce and build upon the comfort women agreement with more bold cooperative measures. Given the appropriate amount of political courage and strategic understanding, South Korea and Tokyo could jointly provide a critical ballast of stability in Asia through new bilateral agreements and actions, outreach to other like-minded nations, and demonstrations of resolve to maintain the peace and security of the region.

*The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Congress or the Congressional Research Service.*
Introduction

In the past several years, the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea have been heralded as “stronger than ever” by a chorus of voices. In Japan, updated bilateral security guidelines, changes to Japan’s internal defense policies, and history-making visits by the two nations’ leaders that demonstrate reconciliation from World War II have reinforced the relationship. In South Korea, Washington and Seoul have advanced in lock-step in responding to North Korea’s provocations by upgrading exercises and U.S. deterrence assets, leading to South Korea’s recent acceptance of a U.S. missile defense system battery on its soil.

But to the enduring frustration of many in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo struggled to advance their own relationship. Relations were mired in controversy over a range of history issues stemming from imperial Japan’s actions in the first half of the twentieth century. The toxic diplomatic relationship—their leaders did not meet until nearly two years after both took office—prohibited even modest trilateral efforts, particularly in the defense realm. As the Obama administration advanced its strategic rebalance to Asia, U.S. officials openly lamented the disconnect between America’s two closest allies, pointing out how poor relations damaged U.S. security interests in the region.

Now, with a change in U.S. leadership, uncertainty about America’s alliances grips both sides of the Pacific. Suddenly, the Japan-South Korea leg of the trilateral relationship appears far more critical to maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. Does the deal reached between Japan and South Korea in 2015 over one of their most charged and emotional history issues illuminate a path forward? Do leaders in Seoul and Tokyo have the political courage to advance their mutual strategic interests, particularly if their alliances with the United States are at least temporarily adrift?
The 2015 Comfort Woman Agreement: Background and Implementation

In late 2015, Japan and South Korea took a tentative step forward to mending their troubled relationship by agreeing to address the contentious issue of “comfort women.” The women, who were forced to provide sex to Japanese soldiers during the World War II era, received an apology from Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who had earlier made statements that cast doubt on whether or not the women were coerced against their will. Per the agreement, the Japanese government also donated one billion yen to a foundation to be established by the South Korean government to assist the remaining victims. Both Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye made significant concessions and took political risk in the negotiations. South Korea secured a Prime Minister’s apology, a donation of 100 percent Japanese government money, and a statement that Japan is “painfully aware of its responsibilities.” Japan avoided accepting legal responsibility, and the two sides’ foreign ministers agreed that the issue would be “finally and irreversibly resolved” if the conditions were met.

Though greeted with protests by many in South Korea, including influential NGOs that advocate for the comfort women, the agreement has been—mostly—successfully implemented. Despite Japanese government dissatisfaction that the statue of a young comfort woman had not been moved from the front of its embassy in Seoul, Tokyo delivered the promised funds after the South Korean government established the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation. In October, the foundation began distributing cash grants of 100 million won to the surviving comfort women. According to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the forty remaining women, at least twenty-nine have agreed to accept the funds.¹

This is not the first time that the two governments tried to resolve this charged historical issue. In the early 1990s, when broad awareness of the
comfort women issue first arose, Seoul and Tokyo worked together to draft the “Kono Statement,” named for the then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. This statement acknowledged the imperial Japanese military’s involvement and apologized to the victims. The Japanese government subsequently established the Asian Women’s Fund and gathered private donations to provide compensation to comfort women. According to the Japanese government, only sixty-one of the 238 surviving Korean comfort women accepted money; many observers claim that the South Korean government discouraged the women from accepting the funds because Tokyo refused to acknowledge legal responsibility. Like the 2015 agreement, the Kono Statement involved the diplomatic effort of both nations, with both giving concessions. The difference with the 2015 agreement is that Seoul has actively encouraged survivors to take the money, indicating more determination to remove the issue as an obstacle to the bilateral relationship.

**Promise for Trilateral Cooperation**

U.S. officials made no secret of their desire for Japan and South Korea to reach this agreement, pressuring both sides to make the necessary concessions. When the deal was announced, the Obama administration hailed it as a breakthrough. Washington was motivated by the desire to foster more effective trilateral security cooperation as part of its strategic rebalance to Asia. In July 2016, the three countries participated in a trilateral missile-tracking exercise near Hawaii, a small step toward creating more engagement among the three militaries. Communication among the three navies was enabled by a Memorandum of Understanding inked in late 2014 that allowed information sharing between Japan and South Korea via the United States.

As the implementation of the comfort women agreement appeared to be on track in November 2016, the two countries provisionally signed a military information sharing agreement known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement, or GSOMIA. While a GSOMIA itself
does not commit either country to any concrete action, it constitutes a fundamental component of further defense cooperation. Despite the political tumult in Seoul that erupted in October 2016, the two sides appeared determined to conclude the agreement. The U.S. Defense Department publicly welcomed the agreement, pointing to the benefits in sharing intelligence in light of the North Korean threat.

**Conclusion**

With likely challenges to both the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances over the next few years, there is an imperative for Seoul and Tokyo to move forward on their own to preserve stability in Northeast Asia. Despite remaining historical grievances, Japan and South Korea may be able to put aside hostilities and take political risks in order to develop more mature and productive bilateral relations. Although the specific policies of the Trump administration are not yet clear, rhetoric from his campaign unsettled U.S. allies, particularly Japan and South Korea. Trump’s campaign questioned whether Japan and South Korea were paying their share of hosting U.S. troops in Asia, suggesting that as president he would not honor U.S. treaty commitments to defend their security or that he may consider withdrawing U.S. troops if the host countries did not increase their contributions.

Trump also suggested that he would be open to Japan and South Korea developing their own nuclear weapons arsenal. Although leaders in Seoul and Tokyo were quick to say they would not pursue such an option, the idea resonated with the public, particularly in South Korea. If the U.S. nuclear umbrella appears to fray, insecurity may compel Japanese and South Korean governments to reconsider this policy option, raising the specter of a broader nuclear arms race in Asia. Extended deterrence is a difficult sell, and even more so if the alliances appear to be wobbling. In response to a perception that the United States no longer guaranteed their security, leaders in Japan and South Korea could turn to other power bases. Perhaps Japan would be drawn closer to Russia, and South
Korea may seek closer relations with China. The cascading geopolitical repercussions in such a scenario are difficult to predict, but suggest heightened instability.

Cooler heads in Seoul and Tokyo could prevail, particularly if the governments can stretch the pragmatism of the comfort women compromise to develop more broad-based trust. If the capitals can put aside—or at least demote in prominence—their enduring historical disputes, they can provide a pillar of stability in East Asia. Although Seoul is mired in a political crisis, the bureaucracies continue to implement important agreements that could jumpstart this diplomatic path. If the Park government can conclude the GSOMIA, as well as move on to other military agreements such as an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), working-level bilateral and trilateral security cooperation can commence. To cement the comfort women agreement, Abe could send personal letters of apology to surviving victims, as his predecessors have done. In return, Seoul could work in earnest to move the comfort women statue to an appropriately prominent space, and pledge to do so before Japanese diplomatic staff return to their embassy, currently undergoing a remodeling.

Courageous leadership—the inklings of which were seen in the drafting of the comfort women agreement—could expand bilateral cooperation further. Concluding a high-quality Japan-South Korea free trade agreement (FTA) could provide an example of how economic partnership could function in the absence of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) pact. More bilateral exercises and drills, particularly those centered on ballistic missile defense, would indicate resolve to North Korea and mark a movement toward a more integrated regional defense system. Signing non-proliferation pledges in Seoul and Tokyo could help stem a possible rush to develop nuclear capabilities. Reaching out to other like-minded countries like Australia and ASEAN countries may provide an alternative web of partners in the region. These goals may seem far-fetched for
two countries that just recently appeared to be in a hostile diplomatic standoff, but a threatened sense of security could provide the necessary impetus to act boldly.

Chapter Endnotes


Being Strategic amid Sanctions: The Trilateral United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea Alliance

Sandra Fahy

Executive Summary

The trilateral alliance of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea faces a complex challenge in 2017. It is clear that North Korea will continue on the path towards further development of nuclear weapons. It is ambiguous how the Trump presidency will respond to this. Trump has already questioned bipartisan pillars of U.S. foreign policy, such as alliances in East Asia. The value of trilateral alliance cooperation on North Korea’s nuclear development program needs to be spelled out for the Trump administration. This can best be done by articulating clear pathways of cooperation with outcomes that are beneficial to all. This paper calls for a trilateral cooperative strategy amid current UN sanctions; a strategy aimed at thwarting North Korea’s access to illicit financial activities. In the wake of finance controls resulting from UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2270 and the recently passed U.S. Magnitsky Act, North Korea is ramping up efforts to gather illicit capital. Strategic trilateral cooperation that controls the flow of illicit finance into North Korea will have positive implications, such as thwarting funding for further nuclear development, while sending a signal about the strength of the trilateral alliance.
Introduction

After North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in January 2016, the United Nations Security Council placed greater sanctions on Pyongyang through Resolution 2270 in March 2016; the strongest of the new constraints included restrictions on financial transfers. With curtailed access to cash and resources that could be used to further develop its nuclear capability, North Korea is facing new economic challenges. Since the sanctions were established, North Korea has not sought diplomatic resolution to these tightening pressures; rather the country has demonstrated a deepening of clandestine methods for getting what it needs. There is an opportunity in this for the trilateral alliance. Alliance members will all benefit from trilateral efforts aimed at controlling North Korea’s access to illicit financial sources. Control of financial sources resulting from legal sanctions such as UNSCR 2270 and the recently passed U.S. Magnitsky Act compels North Korea to seek alternative and creative ways to gather money. Trilateral cooperation aimed at controlling North Korea’s access to illicit financial sources could have positive policy implications, such as thwarting funding for further nuclear development, while sending a signal about the strength of the trilateral alliance.

Money, Nukes, and Sanctions: A Short History

Since the beginning, the UN Security Council has responded to North Korean nuclear developments through resolutions aimed at financially restricting North Korea and forcing it into a non-proliferation stance. The Security Council resolutions operationalize their sanctions primarily through preventing the transport of certain materials into North Korea and restricting the ways those material goods can be transported.

On October 14, 2006, UNSCR 1718 demanded that North Korea refrain from nuclear weapons tests or the launch of ballistic missiles; it also forbade trade with North Korea in items related to arms programs. The resolution put a freeze on assets and travel of North Korean individuals,
in addition to luxury goods imports. After North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test, a month later (June 2009) the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1874. That resolution increased existing prohibitions, enabling greater ease in the inspection of ships and cargo in and out of North Korea and further tightening economic sanctions. North Korea’s satellite launch in December 2012 led to another resolution (2087), which echoed earlier sanctions and tried to increase pressure on North Korea to comply. North Korea’s third nuclear weapons test in February 2013 was followed by the adoption of Resolution 2094 in March 2013. That resolution expanded the list of people subject to travel bans; assets were also frozen. It prohibited the transfer of large quantities of cash connected to North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs; it also compelled states to forbid export assistance to any company trading with North Korea if such trade assisted in proscribed activities. Resolution 2094 resolution also mandated inspections of North Korean cargo if inspectors suspected the presence of prohibited goods.

Since the first nuclear weapons test of 2006, each of the UNSC resolutions has placed greater limitations on North Korea’s access to technology and materials that could be used for nukes and missiles. The pressure increased with each sanction, however before UNSCR 2270 was adopted on March 2, 2016, it was still possible for countries—particularly those who were trade partners with the DPRK—to sidestep sanctions. This was possible because enforcers needed to have obvious intelligence linking technology and materials transfers to support of nuclear and missile programs. One of the results of UNSCR 2270 was isolating North Korea’s illicit economy.

Resolution 2270 aims to disrupt the country’s access to items for nuclear and missile programs. Its sanctions expanded the list of banned nuclear proliferation-related items. The resolution also has other restrictions that target North Korea’s economic vulnerabilities. It prohibits other countries from importing North Korean coal, iron and iron-ore and
rare earth minerals, cutting North Korea off from a main source of hard currency. It also prohibits the DPRK from importing aviation and rocket fuel. To limit the import and export of banned items such as cash and fuel, states are required to inspect all North Korean cargo—into or out of North Korea—if it crosses into their territory. North Korea is prohibited from using other nations’ flagged vessels or aircraft. North Korean diplomats and foreign officials engaged in illicit activities in foreign lands are to be expelled.

In the financial arena, UNSCR 2270 bans DPRK bank branches and offices abroad that have joint ventures with North Korean banks. Setting up banking offices in the DPRK is also prohibited; existing offices are to be closed if they are proved to be associated with financial services contributing to illicit activities. The purpose of UNSCR 2270 is to put the greatest financial pressure on North Korea to date, with the assumption that this will constrain its weapons development and push North Korea to the negotiation table.

**Sanctions: Unpredictable and Vulnerable**

Sanctions have unpredictable effects. Reports indicate that international aid agencies in North Korea have been negatively impacted because of issues related to cash remittances. According to one report, the World Food Program, which typically tries to assist one million vulnerable North Koreans, was only able to help 600,000 in 2016 because of these restrictions. That report added that “The United Nations has been calling on the United States, Russia and the U.N. Security Council to help revive remittances to North Korea so as to keep their operations running. The resolution [2270] includes a clause for not applying sanctions if the humanitarian need arises.” Private sector companies such as banks, shippers and other suppliers are declining or reluctant to provide services to aid agencies. Shipments have been held up by Chinese customs officials who are unsure what new items are included in the sanctions. Water-purification tablets were held up, for example, because the high
chlorine content in them placed them in the dual-use category of concern. Solar panels intended for energy use in a TB diagnostic lab were deemed military grade and stopped by customs officials. It is worth noting the suggestion that such problems may be a “whispering campaign” among aid workers working on behalf of the DPRK government.

Sanctions can also be thwarted. The U.S. Department of the Treasury is concerned about deceptive financial practices by the DPRK, or those acting on behalf of the DPRK. These include obscuring the identity and location of transaction origins, the transfer of funds via third parties, use of repeated bank transfers (where transfer amounts are limited) that seem to have no legitimate purpose, and the use of cash corridors to carry large sums of money. Despite sanctions, as Richard Nephew of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs observes, there is no “blanket prohibition on financial services being provided to North Korea.” So while it will be difficult to bank with North Korea, it will not be impossible. Major trading cities such as Dandong and Hunchun on the border with North Korea have banks that deal with North Korea. These banks will have to make sure that North Korea does not use clandestine methods to open bank accounts with them, as North Korea looks for alternatives in the wake of the U.S. Patriot Act. Cambodia and Indonesia are rumored to be alternative sites for North Korean businesspeople. As recent news reports show, North Korea continues to engage in smuggling activities for cash. There are signs that business is still going on. A major trader in Dandong reported in April 2016 that he received half his payment prior to shipment through money deposited in the Dangong office of the Korea Kwangson Bank, a North Korean bank mentioned by the Treasury Department in March 2016 that does business from an unmarked office on the 13th floor of an office tower on the Yalu River. The rest of the payment was collected after the material arrived in North Korea, usually in renminbi, but sometimes in dollars. Just after UNSCR 2270 was adopted, in March 2016, Sri Lankan authorities detained two North Koreans for failure to report carrying cash above 10,000 USD. They were found with 150,000 USD on route from Oman.
Financial sanctions have a negative impact on the regime as a whole. Their lack of precision means that it becomes difficult for the regime to buy everything from top-market foreign goods favored by the leadership class to strategic metals for nuclear weapons. In North Korea, this has meant higher stakes in the internal trade-offs made by domestic buyers of foreign goods. While the impact on the nuclear program may be unknown, the cost choices within the government become harder and more apparent. The cost of acquiring foreign funds rises, making their internal shadow price higher. Simply put, the cost of obtaining items in terms of domestic trade-offs for foreign nuclear materials becomes considerably higher.15

**Strategic Trilateral Cooperation**

Because sanctions are unpredictable, it is important for the trilateral alliance to move from sanctions to strategy. Victor Cha, observing that a review of sanctions would be necessary at some point in 2017, noted “to avert a predictable train wreck, policy must migrate from sanctions to strategy. After all, sanctions are only means to an end, and they can be ‘unprecedented’ without necessarily achieving their intended purpose.”16 Pressure can be applied to North Korea in many ways. Sanctions are one of these, but domestic laws strategically organized with allies are another. Amid the UN sanctions, each country in the trilateral alliance has supported domestic laws aimed at dealing with North Korea. These laws are strategic responses that strengthen UN Security Council resolutions. They also signal an opportunity for greater cooperation within the alliance to synchronize legal approaches and responses to North Korea.
The U.S. has standing orders such as the North Korea Sanctions Regulations and Executive Orders, which are enforceable without cooperation from trading partners like China. With Executive Orders 13,382 and 13,551, the U.S. can “freeze the assets of Chinese and other third-country entities suspected of helping North Korea’s proliferation activities.” Most recently, the United States passed the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which targets rights abusers financially through visa bans and asset freezes. This act enables the U.S. to act on rights abusers from North Korea, or China, in addition to other nations. The Act may, however, cause tensions between the U.S. and Russia, and herein lies the significance of how the Trump administration will approach existing bipartisan pillars of U.S. diplomacy and alliances.

On June 1, 2016, through U.S. Patriot Act section 311, the U.S. Treasury announced new sanctions aimed at pressuring small regional banks in China, and elsewhere, that facilitate North Korean business. Through the Patriot Act, North Korea is identified as a “primary money-laundering concern” and as such the U.S. can cut off DPRK access to the U.S. financial system. This means that non-American banks and other entities that provide North Korea access to the U.S. financial system via third-country banks are forbidden to conduct dollar transactions for North Korea. According to Jin Qiangyi, dean of the Institute of Northeast Asian Studies at Yanbian University in Yanji China, these new sanctions, which are unilateral, could cost banks heavily and far outweigh the benefits of commercial ties with the DPRK. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying explained that China is opposed to the Patriot Act sanctions because they are unilateral and based on domestic U.S. laws. U.S. sanctions under the North Korea Sanctions Regulations and Executive Orders legally limit U.S. financial exposure to transactions relating to concerns in UNSC resolutions related to the DPRK.

Japan has banned North Korean-registered ships entering Japanese waters, and third-country ships are banned if they have visited ports in
North Korea. Since January of 2016, Japan has banned remittances over ¥100,000 ($870) to North Korea.\textsuperscript{22}

The future South Korean administration’s approach towards North Korea is unclear; however it is likely that the current stance could continue. One illustration of that stance was the South Korean government’s February 2016 decision to close an industrial complex run jointly with North Korea. North Korea’s legal foreign currency earnings have taken a hit since that shutdown.

**Conclusion**

The trilateral alliance could benefit from synchronizing these and other existing domestic laws aimed at controlling North Korea’s illicit financial activities. At Security Council meeting 7638, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power stated the North Korean peoples’ suffering was a direct result of choices the DPRK government was making, which prioritized military spending. “It would rather grow its nuclear weapons programme than its own children,” she stated. She further observed that North Korea was the only Member State to have tested nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century, and the only state to threaten other countries with its nuclear weapons. She stressed, “While there should be no illusion that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would now abruptly halt its pursuit of nuclear weapons, multilateral pressure could be effective in bringing Pyongyang back to the table for serious and credible negotiations on denuclearization.”\textsuperscript{23} The trilateral alliance is an opportunity for the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to act strategically amid UN sanctions.
Chapter Endnotes


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


6. Ibid.


11. Ibid.


15. I am grateful to Arthur Alexander for this observation.


Just twelve months ago it was fashionable to ask if South Korea was tilting towards China. The perceived tilt was the result of a new policy effort by the Park Geun-hye administration to assure that the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and China matched their impressive economic relationship. Now one year later, worries of a South Korea tilt seem antiquated. Relations between the two have rapidly deteriorated and for reasons outlined in this paper are unlikely to recover to previous highs. This downturn presents an opportunity for the trilateral alliance partners of the United States, South Korea, and Japan to further enhance cooperation, with a special focus on the Korea-Japan relationship. Furthering cooperation between these two countries will not only allow all three countries to better meet the North Korea threat, but will send a strong message to China about the strength of U.S. alliances in the region.

With the potential for great power rivalry at its doorstep, South Korea previously sought to play a bridging role between the United States and China. In doing so, it hoped to balance its economic relationship with China with its security relationship with the United States. But those
goals were secondary to its primary aim: convincing China that South Korea would make for a better partner than North Korea. But hopes of reorienting Beijing towards Seoul should now be well and truly dashed. Over the past six months, China has made it abundantly clear that it does not value South Korea’s role as a potential bridge in Northeast Asia. Instead, it has exhibited blatant disregard for South Korean security concerns and even warned of consequences should Seoul defy Beijing’s preferences.

The catalyst for this deterioration was the ongoing dispute over the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea. China has objected strongly to placing the U.S. missile defense battery in South Korea and has allegedly already taken steps to punish South Korea economically for its agreement to deploy the system. A Korean media report has noted a drop in Chinese tourists visiting South Korea, and claims that the reductions are “forced” by the Chinese government.

More recently, a Chinese fishing vessel illegally fishing in South Korean waters rammed and sunk a South Korea Coast Guard speedboat, and in response South Korea summoned a representative of the Chinese embassy in Seoul. China responded by blowing off South Korean concerns. In response, South Korea warned that it will fire on vessels fishing illegally that do not comply with orders issued by its Coast Guard.

These recent events are not the actions of a country willing to act as a partner in good faith. China’s refusal to consider South Korea’s security concerns and its willingness to threaten economic retribution are the actions of a bully and South Korea should take note.

While these recent events serve as the catalyst for the downturn in South Korea-China relations, there is a second trend which suggests that Sino-South Korean relations will remain peppered with tension for the foreseeable future—the influx of Chinese money into the South Korean economy.
The trade ties between the two countries are well recognized. For South Korea, roughly 25 percent of its exports are to China.\(^2\) That dependence may very well grow, although there is already recognition in Korea that it is now overly dependent on China. A slump in China would hurt many economies around the world, but that pain would be acute for South Korea. But these trade relations are only part of the concern.

As Bloomberg has noted in ongoing reporting, Chinese companies are purchasing South Korean companies at a record pace.\(^3\) The outlet also predicts that this trend will continue to accelerate as China attempts to close the technology gap with South Korea. China has already made great strides in mobile handsets and shipbuilding, and now seeks to further reduce the gap between its domestic firms and South Korean firms in other areas. Another part of this trend is Chinese purchases of South Korean debt. In early 2016 China became the largest single foreign holder of won-denominated bonds.\(^4\) While inflows of Chinese money and purchases of debt are rising from a very low base, it lays the foundation for future tensions in the relationship.

Thus far, the acquisition of South Korean companies by Chinese firms has not posed a problem in South Korea. But as those acquisitions increase, it will become an issue for the South Korean public. Public opinion in South Korea is well-known to be less than friendly to foreign direct investment, especially when firms attempt to repatriate earnings. Further challenges loom as Chinese construction companies may begin to compete with Korean firms in Korea’s domestic market across a range of projects. The downward pressure that will be exerted by South Korean public opinion—combined with the growing awareness that China has no intention of recognizing South Korea’s security interests—suggests that the high point for South Korea-China relations has come and gone. It is therefore time that South Korea begins to focus on the trilateral alliance and to take substantive steps to strengthen bilateral cooperation with Japan across a range of issues.
Korea-Japan relations have experienced a modest upswing over the past year, and with appropriate attention, that trend could be continued and accelerated. The December 28, 2015 agreement on comfort women was a step in the right direction. This was rightly considered a breakthrough by many, and took real political will from the Park administration. Even so, the reality is that the severity of South Korean public opinion towards Japan has long been overblown. The reason the December 28 agreement has managed to hold is that a majority of the South Korean public has been supportive of improving relations with Japan for longer than is usually recognized. The same is true for why the signing of GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) created virtually no public backlash when it was signed in late 2016.

The signing of GSOMIA was first attempted under Lee Myung-bak, but its signing was cancelled just hours prior to the event. Most commentary attributed the public outrage in South Korea to opposition to signing a military agreement with Japan. This was not the case. Public opinion data made clear that opposition to the agreement was actually opposition to a highly unpopular Lee Myung-bak. The agreement’s signing under President Park was done under different circumstances. Her administration was already engulfed in scandal, but even so there was very little attention paid to the agreement. Even her political opponents made no real effort to block its passage just at a time when the president and her policies were most vulnerable. This suggests there is tacit support across society for increased cooperation with Japan.

With GSOMIA in place, it is now time for South Korea to consider the next steps. For its part, Japan is ready to move forward at a pace that is comfortable for South Korea. The next step is to begin negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). As the name suggests, this would allow the two countries to exchange a variety of military goods and services, while committing neither to any kind of military action in the future. But this would establish the framework for much more integrated cooperation across a range of activities, particularly
on the military side. South Korea may find this sensitive, but given the threat it faces it should begin to lay the groundwork for negotiations sooner rather than later.

The primary point for emphasis on military cooperation should be on naval operations. Given the threat posed by North Korea, there is a clear rationale for both sides to commit to anti-submarine training exercises. North Korea’s submarines may be decades behind technologically speaking, but they still pose a serious threat to both South Korea and Japan. With the recent progress on a submarine-launched ballistic missile that threat is increasing, making anti-submarine exercises a potentially valuable mode of cooperation for both sides.

Second, both countries face the problem of Chinese fishing vessels. The problem for South Korea of Chinese ships fishing illegally in the Yellow Sea is not one that will go away in the short-term. Likewise, Chinese encroachment in and around the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands will continue, providing a shared point of experience for both South Korea and Japan. The two countries should come together to share best practices in dealing with illegal incursions. This should include live bilateral exercises, and if these exercises grow to include Vietnam and other countries around the South China Sea, all the better. Of course, China will be sensitive to such exercises but that should not curtail Korea’s pursuit of such exercises. They could play a key role in ensuring best practices are used in encounters between its Coast Guard and fishing vessels to ensure there are no further deaths.

There will likely be domestic critics of South Korean rapprochement with Japan. Part of this criticism will be based on historical grievances. Those voices are not new. However, these voices are diminishing over time and polling data shows that there is very real and continued support for taking steps to improve the bilateral relationship with Japan. Adding to this is the growing realization of the serious threats faced by South Korea. As these increase, those objections will continue to diminish.
A second, more potent set of objections will arise from those in South Korea that worry about the potential for Chinese economic retribution. Such retribution would emanate from a perception in Beijing that South Korea is stepping up its participation in the perceived effort to contain China. Current regional dynamics, however, suggest that China’s core interests would be undermined by a campaign to punish South Korea for either introducing THAAD or explicitly increasing cooperation with Japan on naval operations whose aim is to explore best practices when dealing with Chinese fishing vessels.

In the ongoing saga of the South China Sea, China was recently handed a golden opportunity to showcase its ability to both understand and share the interests of other countries in the region. The catalyst for this was, of course, the statements made by Rodrigo Duterte, president of the Philippines. At a time when countries in the region—and Vietnam in particular—are weary of China’s intentions, the developments in the Philippines provide the chance for China to exhibit its responsible stakeholder credentials. So far, China is attempting to do precisely that. As this takes place, for China to wage a retribution campaign against South Korea would undermine its messaging in the South China Sea. It would show that China is, in fact, incapable of accommodation and countries like Vietnam will take note.

For the past four years, South Korea pursued closer ties with Beijing in hopes that China’s position on North Korea would evolve. However, China has made it clear that any evolution in its policy will take place independent of South Korean policy initiatives. China has also made it clear that it is ready to punish South Korea for perceived missteps. The answer is not to acquiesce and bow to China’s desires. Instead, South Korea not only should more actively pursue improved relations and cooperation with the United States, but also push for those improvements with Japan. This increased cooperation will pay dividends in facing the North Korea threat, as well as sending a clear message to China that the trilateral alliance remains as strong as ever.
Chapter Endnotes


New Rules for Engagement: Redefining Trilateral Trade Relations

Shihoko Goto

**Executive Summary**

With the outlook for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement murky at best under new U.S. leadership, some see diminished prospects for multilateral trade deals worldwide. Certainly, the expectation that TPP eventually would expand to become the free trade pact joining South Korea, Japan, and the United States is unlikely to become a reality any time soon. Despite the TPP setback, however, the three countries continue to share a mutual interest in the development of stable, transparent trade rules. The setback could also be seen as an opportunity to redefine the objectives of trade deals by concentrating on the economic gains to be made through common rules and standards rather than the political dimensions. It should also be a new opportunity for Tokyo and the new government in Seoul to make a concerted case for the United States to avert protectionist policies that could hurt investment flows on both sides of the Pacific. It should also deemphasize the call for the United States to spearhead efforts to establish new rules for economic engagement in the region that challenge China’s vision head-on, and instead focus on the specific economic gains that otherwise would not have been possible.
What is “Fair” Trade?

For the proponents of TPP, the trade agreement has been regarded as a highly ambitious framework. This is because it aims not just to reduce tariffs in key sectors including automobiles and agriculture, but more importantly, to establish rules in areas that have not been covered by free trade agreements until now, including protecting intellectual property rights and establishing cross-border rules for e-commerce. While alternative regional trade deals, most notably the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement (RCEP), have been touted as credible alternatives for TPP, they are actually poor substitutes, given that they do not adequately address the needs of industries that will continue to expand across borders in the 21st century. So even as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has made clear his skepticism about TPP, his mantra has been for the nation to pursue a “fair” trade deal that would curb the exodus of U.S. jobs overseas, if not reverse the trend altogether. This should be encouraging.

The issue of what constitutes “fair” rules on non-tariff issues could actually unite Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington, instead of dividing them. The rules that have already been laid out by TPP could be a solid basis for negotiation. Certainly, TPP’s chapters on enhancing cross-border trade would benefit not only blue-chip companies, but also small- and medium sized enterprises eager to cut down the bureaucratic hurdles they currently face. All three countries could reach a consensus on rules leading to greater efficiency, from facilitating e-commerce to reducing the amount of paperwork that needs to be filed to authorize transactions. Such rules would level the playing field not just between countries, but between large- and smaller-sized businesses. Meanwhile, given that this is the first multilateral effort to ensure that foreign companies can become more competitive with state-owned enterprises, the rules could provide a blueprint for issues on which Japan and South Korea can work together with the United States, regardless of what trade agreements they may pursue in the future. In short, these would be rules that could level the playing field and ensure fairer trade.
Yet the economic case for TPP has increasingly become secondary to the political rationale behind the ambitious agreement. Certainly, the Obama administration has made a concerted effort to press for the deal as a foreign policy priority, with officials from the Pentagon as well as the State Department, Commerce Department, and USTR arguing that ratifying the agreement is critical for the United States to remain a Pacific power. TPP has been positioned as the economic arm of the U.S. rebalance to Asia. But to conclude that U.S. failure to ratify the TPP is a failure of U.S. economic engagement in Asia and a failure of the U.S. rebalance to Asia would be foolhardy. TPP is not the only way to establish international rules of law. All twelve TPP member countries, including the United States, will continue to seek ways to ensure greater access to markets that are transparent. Moving forward, it will be imperative to play down the diplomatic case for pushing forward with trade agreements. Instead, the focus must be on how transparency and efficiency will be enhanced through the establishment of common rules, which in turn will boost corporate profits.

With Europe continuing to face political turmoil and economic uncertainty, global business interests in the Asia-Pacific will actually only increase. The biggest opportunities in coming years will be from Asia, and Japanese and Korean businesses’ expectations for rules facilitating trade will grow with the opportunities for cross-border trade.

Reaching a Consensus on Trade Objectives

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first world leader to meet directly with President-elect Trump post-election, and Abe made clear that he wanted the United States to ratify the TPP, despite clear signals from Trump that he would not support the current deal. Of course, the TPP cannot come into effect without the United States because one of the key conditions for it to be adopted will not be met without Washington: namely that a minimum of six signatories must be on board and together they must represent at least 85 percent of the GDP of the twelve original
signatories. Even combined, Japan and the United States represent just under 80 percent of the total GDP threshold that is required. But the possibility remains for TPP rules to be adopted by the other members under a different name, such as TPP11. That partnership would actually have the potential to be open to new members, including South Korea. However, if that route is to be taken, Japan—the single largest economic power among the eleven nations—would be the lead country in bringing members together. For Tokyo to successfully promote the vision of a new TPP, it must publicly emphasize the specific economic benefits of the deal, especially its rules-focused benefits, rather than focusing on the international security angle of the deal. Southeast Asian nations, including Malaysia and the Philippines, are increasingly looking towards Beijing not just economically, but politically too. Promoting a new deal to prevent China from pushing forward its own rules will become less and less compelling to these nations, as well as to the new government in Seoul and the incoming Republican administration in Washington.

The fact that both South Korea and the United States will have new leaders, while Shinzo Abe will be one of the longest-lasting heads of an industrialized nation, cannot be ignored. This is especially true in the context of a rapidly changing Asia where the future of U.S. engagement remains uncertain. Abe’s success as an elder statesman will be determined in part by whether he can play a leading role in defining common trade interests between the three countries and ensure that a hostile trade war ignited by excessive protectionist measures on all sides is averted.

While prospects for TPP to be ratified by all twelve member countries and then expanded have diminished, possibilities for closer trade relations between Japan, South Korea, and the United States have not. The immediate challenge ahead will be to avoid the resurgence of the trade wars from past decades, and to ensure that trade deals lead to cross-border job creation and economic growth.
Trilateral Partnership against the Winds of Political Change

Ellen Kim

Executive Summary

The U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership has served as an effective vehicle for strengthening and expanding trilateral cooperation in the face of the three countries’ common regional and global challenges in Asia. Looking to 2017 and beyond, there are new challenges in the offing, particularly as a result of the political crisis unfolding in South Korea. In addition, a political leadership change in Washington in early 2017 will have important implications for trilateral cooperation. As a result, it is critical for the three countries to continue close consultations and work together to ensure that their policy cooperation and coordination do not go astray because of domestic political developments. Furthermore, in light of growing uncertainties policymakers should be prepared for changes to the current security environment, map out a common vision and agenda, and lay out a road map for stronger and more effective trilateral cooperation and coordination in the coming years.

Today Asia is facing both opportunities and challenges. From North Korea’s continuous nuclear and missile tests, resurgent historical and territorial disputes, to China’s rise and its increased projection of power,
a wide range of issues makes the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership ever more important in ensuring peace and stability in the region. Although historical and territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan set trilateral cooperation off course and drifting for a while, a U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership built on shared interests and values has served as an effective vehicle for strengthening and expanding cooperation in the face of common regional and global challenges. Looking to 2017 and beyond, however, there are new challenges in the offing, particularly as a result of recent political developments in South Korea and the U.S., and this requires the three countries to work together to prepare for changes in the current security environment, map out a common vision and agenda, and lay out a road map for stronger and more effective trilateral cooperation and coordination in the coming years.

Among the unexpected yet imminent challenges facing the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership are domestic political risks and uncertainties in South Korea and the U.S. as they go through political upheaval and potentially rough leadership transitions. In South Korea, a political crisis engulfed the country in November 2016 when President Park Geun-hye was implicated in a political corruption scandal involving a confidant who wielded undue influence behind the scene, extorted money from businesses, and interfered in state affairs. Public outrage over the scandal led the National Assembly to vote to impeach President Park in early December. Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn assumed presidential authority on an interim basis to prevent a power vacuum in Seoul while the Constitutional Court is mulling over the legality of her impeachment. If the court upholds the motion, South Korea will hold an early presidential election within sixty days after President Park is removed from office. Ramifications of domestic political turmoil in Seoul are undeniably detrimental to trilateral partnership. In light of the political leadership transition in Washington, political disarray and rising uncertainties in Seoul—including the prospect of an early presidential election looming in the country—could hamper close dialogue for effective and sustained
policy cooperation and coordination among the three countries. That is particularly true when domestic crises spill over into government decision-making and drive policy, which seems to be emerging in Seoul. Politicians from opposition parties recently began to call for a reexamination of the Park government’s agreement with Japan on the comfort women issue and its decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system to South Korea. To prevent any potential setback, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan should maintain close consultations and careful management of the situation through combined efforts. At the same time, this will require the South Korean government to actively work with politicians to contain or minimize the impact of political fallout from its domestic crisis.

Effectively dealing with North Korea challenges has been at the heart of U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership. Over the past eight years, the three countries have demonstrated strong solidarity in response to North Korea’s provocations and maintained tight policy cooperation and coordination in tandem with the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” approach to North Korea. In Pyongyang, the inauguration of Donald Trump as the new U.S. president is viewed as a window of opportunity, allowing the regime to open a dialogue for talks, reset its relations with Washington, and ultimately push the new administration to recognize nuclear North Korea. In response to Kim Jong-un’s New Year message that the country is close to testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could reach the U.S., President-elect Trump flatly dismissed the North Korea’s technological capability. But the gravity and urgency of the North Korean threat, demonstrated by the country’s latest nuclear test, cannot be ignored and needs to be a top national security priority for his administration. The incoming Trump administration has yet to develop a concrete North Korea policy and it may take a while until we see a clearer contour of the new administration’s Asia policy. But given President-elect Trump’s hard stance on China, the new administration’s North Korea policy could be complicated and caught up in possible friction between
Washington and Beijing, or even fuel further hostility between them if the U.S. imposes secondary sanctions on North Korea that threaten Chinese firms and citizens. Against this backdrop, close consultation and policy coordination need to be continued among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Soon after the start of the Trump administration, a high-level trilateral meeting should be held to establish a common vision and agenda and send a clear message to Pyongyang that the country’s denuclearization will continue to be a common policy goal.

Following North Korea’s two nuclear tests in 2016, the public’s increased perception of threat—combined with frustration and skepticism on the effectiveness of sanctions—could be detected in several countries, most notably South Korea, where the public voice for South Korea’s own nuclear weapons development began to surge again. In the wake of the fifth nuclear test, 58 percent of South Koreans supported the nuclear weapons development, while 34 percent were opposed.² Historically, economic sanctions have a mixed record of success as a policy tool. Moreover, the cost of the sanctions is often borne by the people living in a target country. Sanctions have not been able to generate the desired effects in North Korea in part because the country’s extreme isolation in the world has made it less susceptible to outside pressures. Unlike Iran, whose oil exports are critical to its economy, making it vulnerable to tough international sanctions, North Korea does not have active trading relationships with countries other than its main ally, China. More importantly, China’s priority remains regime stability, and some point to China’s resolve and diverging interests as the primary reason why the sanctions have not worked.³ Having said that, some loopholes were also found in the previous sanctions. In September 2016, the U.S. government sanctioned a Chinese firm, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co., for helping the regime evade the sanctions.⁴ Given this, the successful full implementation of the sanctions by UN member countries including China will be critical and this issue needs to be further addressed by countries.
In the absence of any tangible progress on North Korea issues, the conclusion of a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between South Korea and Japan in November 2016 was a notable development and an important step toward trilateral security cooperation. This military cooperation, allowing direct intelligence sharing between the two countries, will complement and augment their military capability and allow them to more effectively deal with North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats. In light of public sentiment and sensitivity regarding historical and territorial disputes between the two countries, however, South Korea and Japan should pursue military cooperation with greater transparency and caution, a lesson learned from a previous setback during the Lee Myung-bak administration as the government met intense domestic criticism for allegedly trying to strike a deal in backrooms. More importantly, military cooperation between South Korea and Japan should proceed in tandem with active efforts by both governments to engage the public to ensure their understanding about the importance of such cooperation. Failing to do so has the potential to backfire in the future and could erode the foundation of trilateral cooperation.

Uncertainties about the future trajectory of U.S. Asia policy under the incoming Trump administration is another challenge. Amidst speculation and wild guesses, one of the oft-raised questions is whether (and also to what extent) the U.S. will stay engaged in Asia. President-elect Donald Trump’s remarks during the election campaign indicated his dissatisfaction with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Korea-U.S. FTA and the Special Measurement Agreement (SMA, also known as the cost-sharing agreement), making South Korea and Japan nervous about a potentially dramatic shift in U.S. Asia policy under the new administration. Signaling his plan to designate China as a currency manipulator, President-elect Trump has shown a tough stance on China, which doesn’t seem to bode well for U.S.-China relations in the coming years. Undoubtedly, future U.S. relations with Asian countries will be complex and unpredictable, if not destabilizing.
While much of the new administration’s Asia policy remains to be seen, a possible U.S. return to isolationism and protectionism would undercut U.S. global leadership and be detrimental to the country. This would also have consequences for the international community, which is increasingly susceptible to waning U.S. influence. This was evidenced at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Lima, Peru in November 2016 as leaders of countries expressed their concerns about the prospects for the TPP trade pact. Prime Minister John Key of New Zealand said, “The TPP was all about the United States showing leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. We like the U.S. being in the region. But if the U.S. is not there that void needs to be filled, and it will be filled by China.”

His statement coincided with President Xi Jinping’s remarks at the summit touting China as a new champion of free trade and setting out the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) as a new global trade agenda under China’s leadership.

What does this changing global environment imply for U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation? Given that there is so much uncertainty at the moment about the exact direction of future U.S. trade policy, its policy implications are unclear. But TPP has been a major pillar of the Obama administration’s rebalancing toward Asia, and Japan is one of its strong advocates. If the U.S. abandons TPP as President-elect Trump has suggested, this will be a huge setback for Tokyo. In addition, some have warned the balance of the global economy could shift in favor of China.

Amidst this fluid situation, it may be worth recognizing China’s growing role in the global economy. And China’s embrace of open, free trade should not be flatly dismissed but should be considered as a positive sign that is indicative of the country’s deep integration in the current economic order and its increased willingness to protect it. In his Foreign Affairs article, John Ikenberry noted, “the United States cannot thwart China’s rise, but it can help ensure that China’s power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted over the century, rules and institutions that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of future.”

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Change increases uncertainty and can often become destabilizing. Yet it can also offer an opportunity, and it is in this spirit that the U.S., South Korea and Japan should work with other like-minded partners to engage with China. Greater regional integration and interdependence based on common interest drive countries to seek peaceful solutions and not to resort to force. If a discussion of FTAAP is formally launched, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea should consider active participation and play a constructive role as agenda setters and rule-makers to preserve the current international order and promote and protect the interests of all stakeholders.

**What May Be Ahead for the Trilateral Partnership:**

- In the short-run, the U.S. and Japan should prepare and remain ready for potential political uncertainties in South Korea. For South Korea, political leaders and policymakers should work together to prevent the political crisis from spilling over into the country’s foreign policy apparatus and the trilateral partnership.

- In light of a political change in the U.S., trilateral ministerial-level meetings in early 2017 seem necessary to enhance trilateral unity and ensure close policy coordination and consultation, particularly in regards to North Korea.

- The conclusion of GSOMIA between South Korea and Japan was an important step forward, allowing both countries to effectively deal with North Korea’s threats. In the future, any additional military cooperation between the two countries should proceed with greater transparency and engagement with the public to ensure greater understanding about the importance of such cooperation.
Chapter Endnotes


2. Gallup Korea Daily Opinion 228 (September 20–22, 2016) [http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=778&pagePos=1&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=].


6. “China maneuvers to fill US free-trade role,” *Financial Times*, November 20, 2016, [https://www.ft.com/content/c3840120-aeel-11e6-a37c-f4a0f1b0fa1](https://www.ft.com/content/c3840120-aeel-11e6-a37c-f4a0f1b0fa1).

7. Ibid.

For over a year, strategic ties between the United States and its two key allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea, showed promising signs of improvement. Certainly, the seeming free fall in ROK-Japan relations over the past several years appeared to have abated—until very recently—due to the December 28, 2015 agreement between South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe over the contentious “comfort women” issue.

The agreement, in essence, prompted Prime Minister Abe to make an unequivocal statement acknowledging Imperial Japan’s coercion of Korean women into sexual servitude during the Second World War in exchange for a pledge from President Park that South Korea would never bring up the “comfort women” issue again in official talks. The fact that such an agreement was a prerequisite for enhanced defense ties between Tokyo and Seoul underscores how significant the history factor is in determining the extent to which the two countries can cooperate with each other and the United States in the security realm, even in areas where there is an obvious overlap of strategic interests.
Indeed, these overlapping security interests are all the more prominent in the face of North Korea’s ongoing nuclear and missile developments. Over the past year, the North has demonstrated new missile launching capabilities, particularly at sea, as well as its fourth and fifth nuclear tests on January 6 and September 9, 2016. These troubling developments demonstrate that the regime in Pyongyang is as determined as ever to pursue nuclear and missile programs in defiance of multiple UN resolutions. As usual, the regime is also attempting to use these provocations to divide the international community, particularly the U.S.-led network of alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.

The response from the international community this time around, however, is increasingly severe. In the wake of the North’s nuclear tests in January and September, as well as subsequent missile tests, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolutions 2270 and 2321, imposing increased sanctions on the regime. China not only endorsed these tougher sanctions but has also been more vocal than ever in criticizing Pyongyang’s actions.

Meanwhile, after months of hand-wringing, South Korea announced its decision in July 2016 to deploy a joint Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system with the United States—thus determining that concerns about North Korea’s missile development ultimately outweighed China’s vocal objections to a new U.S.-led missile defense system in its backyard.

It is against this backdrop of heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula that the December 28th comfort women agreement between President Park and Prime Minister Abe was reached. Until that point, bilateral relations were sinking under the weight of historical grievances, principally revolving around the comfort women issue and suspicions in Seoul that Prime Minister Abe is a nationalist leader intent on whitewashing the past. In the first several years of their respective administrations, President Park refused to meet one-on-one with Prime Minister Abe
until he dropped his “revisionist” claims. It was only after U.S. President Barack Obama brokered a meeting between the two leaders on the outskirts of the Hague Nuclear Summit in 2014 that they met one-on-one essentially for the first time.

The comfort women agreement is non-binding, inconclusive and hastily executed, but it has achieved one important purpose: it has created a floor for keeping the ROK-Japan relationship from deteriorating further and, by extension, impeding trilateral cooperation with the United States. Whether this floor is solid like concrete, cracked, or somewhat elastic, however, may well determine how the bilateral and trilateral dynamic will evolve from here on out. If the floor is solid like concrete, it can help prevent the relationship from falling to lower levels of discord. If it is cracked, then it will only be a temporary restraint on this free fall. And if it has some elasticity, it can perhaps be a springboard for greater defense cooperation moving forward.

For much of the past year, the agreement appeared to have elements of this last characteristic, bringing about a modest rebound in ROK-Japan relations as well as some tangible progress in U.S.-ROK-Japan defense cooperation. Not long after the December 28th agreement was reached, all three nations signed onto a trilateral information sharing agreement (TISA) by which Japan and the ROK can share military intelligence via U.S. channels. This is in lieu of a bilateral Japan-ROK general sharing of military intelligence agreement (GSOMIA) that famously fell apart at the last minute in 2014.

Further, all three nations engaged in an unprecedented joint missile tracking exercise on the sidelines of the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval exercises off Hawaii in June 2016—an important step toward trilateral coordination in response to advancements in North Korean missile systems. And toward the end of 2016, Tokyo and Seoul reinitiated talks on completing a bilateral GSOMIA, in what is the most promising sign yet that the two sides can deepen their defense cooperation.
All of these developments would be difficult to achieve under more contentious circumstances. Indeed, while it would be an exaggeration to attribute too much credit to the December 28th agreement for this new level of trilateral cooperation, it is hard to imagine trilateral cooperation advancing at all if not for a requisite improvement in the comfort women issue.

This points to a peculiar paradox—that the U.S.-ROK-Japan strategic triangle is only as strong as its weakest link (in this case, the Japan-ROK leg), yet improvements in bilateral defense ties often require the cover of trilateral cooperation to gain momentum. Indeed, as the first round of (failed) ROK-Japan GSOMIA talks and (successful) U.S.-ROK-Japan TISA experience suggests, what cannot be achieved on a bilateral basis can sometimes be achieved under the political cover of trilateral cooperation. In other words, trilateralism has, at times, served as an important proxy for bilateralism between Japan and South Korea.

This is not an altogether unwelcome trend, as long as it leads to net improvements in strategic cooperation among all three sides. But it signals that even with overlapping security interests, Tokyo and Seoul are largely unable to bring themselves to higher levels of cooperation without some intervention and involvement from the United States. In particular, there are remaining South Korean sensitivities about cooperating directly with Japan on matters of national security given widespread mistrust of Japanese strategic intentions as a result of its colonial legacy.

But this approach to enhanced trilateral cooperation is vulnerable to several variables, not least of which are domestic political developments. U.S. President-elect Donald J. Trump repeatedly criticized U.S. alliance commitments during the 2016 presidential campaign, singling out the security arrangements with South Korea and Japan in particular. If Trump’s campaign rhetoric is to be believed, then there could be profound implications for U.S. diplomatic and strategic engagement in Asia when he is in the White House.
The incoming Trump presidency is already sending shock waves across the Pacific and raising questions about the longevity of the U.S. strategic commitment in the region. Among other things, a potential scaling back of U.S. security guarantees could compel Japan and South Korea to see each other as more serious security threats, as opposed to occasional antagonists over history disputes. Even the slightest erosion of that guarantee could compel both countries to raise their defenses, triggering an arms race and potentially destabilizing the region. At least on the campaign trail, Trump seemed quite willing to risk that scenario, even encouraging Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons so as to reduce its dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

As a leader who has built his political fortune on the promise of change, such dramatic disruptions of the status quo may be irresistibly compelling to Donald Trump. The realities of governing may help him recognize the benefits of the current alliance-based system in Asia. Barring that, however, it seems quite possible that a major rupture in the U.S.-led alliance system would have severe consequences for the prospects of enhanced trilateral cooperation among the United States, ROK and Japan, let alone for delicate U.S. diplomatic efforts to reconcile ties between its two Asian allies.

Domestic political factors are not just limited to the United States. Although the July 2016 Upper House elections in Japan likely gave Prime Minister Abe at least two more years in office, he remains somewhat vulnerable to further economic downturns and no clear political successor seems in the wings when he eventually steps down from power. Thus while the Abe government seems on terra firma for the time being, there is some underlying uncertainty about the Japanese political situation in the post-Abe era. Whether the next prime minister will honor the spirit of the December 28th comfort women agreement, or any other measures to reconcile historical differences with South Korea, remains to be seen.
Perhaps even more damaging is the political turmoil in South Korea following the impeachment vote of President Park Geun-hye in the wake of late 2016 reports that a personal confidant of hers, Choi Soon-sil, was given classified information and other political favors as a result of her close ties to the president. At this writing, President Park remains in the Blue House but is in political limbo as the impeachment process goes through judicial review and as various political contenders in the opposition and ruling camps vie to succeed her.

In the midst of this ongoing turmoil, in late December South Korean activists erected a statue commemorating the comfort women outside the Japanese Consulate in Busan, causing Prime Minister Abe to recall the Japanese ambassador and consulate general in Busan in protest and calling off other high level economic talks. Needless to say, this represents a serious setback for the December 28th agreement and other efforts to improve bilateral ties in the coming year.

Amid these powerful political headwinds, the future of trilateral cooperation appears somewhat uncertain. With the exception of Prime Minister Abe, political leadership in Washington and Seoul is undergoing fundamental change, with potentially dramatic implications for diplomatic and strategic cooperation. If the past is any guide, historical reconciliation requires, at a minimum, leaders with the vision to overcome parochial interests and popular domestic sentiment in order to achieve longer-term diplomatic and strategic gains. Thus far, President-elect Trump has not shown that foresight, and whoever may emerge as his Korean counterpart could be equally shortsighted.

Yet just as external crises—none more reliable than those triggered by North Korean provocations—have driven Tokyo and Seoul together at times, they may again serve to highlight strategic priorities over historical disagreements in the near future. This may compel leaders in Tokyo, Washington and Seoul to refocus their attention on strategic cooperation and the necessary steps to achieve it. The stakes have perhaps never been higher.
The comfort women issue stands today as arguably the most divisive issue in Japanese-South Korea relations and, by extension, the issue most responsible for limiting the strength of the trilateral alliance between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. This is so despite a historic December 28, 2015 agreement concluded between Japanese prime minister Shinzō Abe and South Korean president Park Geun-hye by which, in return for Seoul’s promise not to press further claims on the issue, Tokyo acknowledged the involvement of imperial army authorities in the comfort women system and provided for the establishment of a private fund for compensation of $8.3 million dollars to the forty-six surviving comfort women. At its conclusion, the Japanese government declared the agreement to be “final and irreversible.”

Recent events in the city of Busan reveal, however, that South Korean civil society is loath to allow the comfort women debate to lapse into silence. On December 28, 2016, the first anniversary of the landmark Abe-Park agreement, a life-size statue of a young woman in traditional Korean dress appeared on a sidewalk near the southern port town’s local Japanese consulate. The statue closely resembled a bronze figure, also
commemorating a comfort woman, installed in 2011 near the Japanese embassy in Seoul which generated heated protests from Japan’s Foreign Ministry and survived repeated attempts at removal. The Busan statue was removed by local municipal authorities on the day of its appearance, only to be reinstalled by the same authorities two days later to placate an enraged citizenry. Meanwhile in Tokyo, Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada visited Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine (a controversial site commemorating Japan’s war dead, including several convicted war criminals), providing fresh evidence for South Koreans who cite a combination of what they view as Japan’s willful historical amnesia, unrepentant nationalism, and rising militarism as the true threats to East Asian peace and security. The continued aggravation of relations between Japan and South Korea was revealed on January 6, 2017 when Tokyo recalled its ambassador to Seoul. On January 7, a 64-year old South Korean Buddhist monk set himself on fire in protest of the December 2015 agreement, leaving behind a note containing his indictment of Park Geun-hye as a “traitor” to the nation.

Political pragmatism demands recognition that the sharp divide separating the two opposing sides of the comfort women issue will never fully be resolved. What, then, can be done? The historical evolution of the controversy in South Korea and Japan illustrates how the sharp divide was generated and perhaps suggests ways to ameliorate the divide.

The Beginnings of the Debate

On August 14, 1991, Kim Haksun emerged as the first woman to step into the media spotlight and publicly declare her victimhood as a comfort woman during World War II. The impetus behind the sixty-six year-old Kim’s decision was, reportedly, the outrage she experienced when, four months earlier, a representative of the Toshiki Kaifu cabinet in Japan claimed that there was “no documentation” linking comfort stations to Japanese soldiers or wartime officialdom. Then, on January 11, 1992, less than half a year following Kim’s “coming out,” Japan’s Asahi Shimbun
New Dimensions in Debates over the Comfort Women Issue

reported on historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi’s discovery of documents establishing government construction and oversight of comfort stations in army-occupied areas of the continent and Japanese metropole. Official accountability followed archival discovery when, on January 17, prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa issued a private apology to South Korean president Roh Tae-woo. By 1993, the apology was made public—while being expanded to include women of all nationalities harmed by the comfort women system—in the so-called “Kōno Statement” issued by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yōhei Kōno.¹ In its penultimate paragraph, the Kōno Statement reads: “We shall face squarely the historical facts [sic] instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.”

In the almost two and a half decades since issuance of the Kōno Statement, a variety of journalists, scholars, and other concerned citizens have turned their attention to documenting and describing the particulars of the wartime comfort women system. As the body of literature grows, the flash-points continue to center around the veracity of testimony by survivors and their allies, the extent and nature of compulsion, and of course, the culpability of the Japanese state. But now, issues of freedom of academic expression and lingering colonial legacies have complicated the debate within the domestic communities of each of the trilateral nations.

While the December 2015 Abe-Park agreement was intended to put an end to contentious disputes over the comfort women system, the most recent deterioration of diplomatic relations reveals the very long half-life of the issue. It is too a reminder that contention regarding the facts of Japan’s wartime past has been a steady feature of the nation’s postwar experience. Even so, the intensity with which this past has been re-examined and indeed, re-imagined in the last couple of years has been remarkable.
Park Yuha and Historical Inquiry

In August 2013, Park Yuha, a professor of Japanese literature at Seoul’s Sejong University, published a book entitled, *Comfort Women of the Empire: Colonial Control and the Struggle over Memory*, her second on the subject of those adolescents and women forced to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers during World War II. Her first book had been published in 2005 and was entitled *In Search of Reconciliation: Textbooks, Comfort Women, Yasukuni, Dokdo*. Park had however been dissatisfied by the success of her first attempt to make a compelling argument combatting the view that comfort women were prostitutes, as routinely argued by so-called “comfort women deniers.” Thus did Park take up her pen again, now situating the comfort women within a system of structural violence: the wartime Japanese empire. Park’s parallel aim in the 2013 book was to add the voices of the comfort women to the debate. Though Kim Haksun’s voice had for all intents and purposes started that debate, she and others had, over the decades, been drowned out by a swelling chorus of diplomats, politicians, and NGOs.

*Comfort Women of the Empire* attracted attention within the Korean academy, drawing like-minded scholars and activists to a spring 2014 symposium in which the issue of structural violence and empire gained support as a new way to frame the debate and prompt a new reckoning with Japanese postwar subjectivity. But, it was not until June 2014 that Park’s book became a sensation—for it was then that nine former comfort women residents of the Nanumul Jip, or “House of Sharing” in Korea’s Gwangju province filed suit (both civil and criminal) against Park for defamation. Of greatest offense were Park’s claims (1) of the complicity of Korean merchants, townspeople and farmers in the trafficking of Korean young women into the comfort stations; (2) that only a small minority of the comfort women were under age twenty; (3) that Korean women shared sympathies with the Japanese soldiers with whom they were forced to have sexual relations; and (4) that the comfort women system was not a form of sexual slavery.
Japan’s *Asahi Shim bun* publishing house released a Japanese translation of *Comfort Women of the Empire* in November 2014. The response from the liberal media was, by and large, enthusiastic. Literary critic and cultural commentator Professor Gen’ichirō Takahashi reviewed the book in the November 27 issue of the *Asahi*, revealing that it had made a “deep impression on him,” that it was “a rigorous work that would give its readers pause.” By “lending [her] ear to the singular voices of individual comfort women,” Takahashi wrote, “Park has revealed stories that we have never before heard.” The book sold briskly, reaching nine printings by February 2016.

Yet, a small group of historians, gender studies scholars, and social activists in Japan—especially those associated with the Violence Against Women in War Research Action Center (VAWW/RAC) and the Committee for Action on Resolving the Imperial Army’s Comfort Women Problem—criticized *Comfort Women of the Empire* on multiple counts. Their criticisms centered on two main objections. First was Park’s methodology. Rather than conducting her own research, Park had merely recycled material, they charged, from a multi-volume series of comfort women oral histories published in 1993 by the Japan and Chongsindae Research Association and The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery. What is more, she had confused fiction with reality through frequent reference to Taijirō Tamura’s 1947 novel, *Baishunden*, or “Tales of Prostitution.” A second set of objections focused on the assumptions underlying Park’s argumentation: namely, Park’s belief that the 1910 annexation of Korea by Japan was legal and, therefore, that the comfort women system could not be considered sexual slavery.

Fundamentally, too, Park’s critics drew attention to the fact that in focusing on the complicity of Korean men in selling their daughters to Korean procurers who then managed their transfer to comfort stations, Park reduced (some would say negated) the culpability of Japanese military officials and their civilian overseers. In so doing, she aligned herself
(however unwittingly) with the deniers. As for Park’s ambition to draw
attention to the structural violence of the colonial enterprise as a whole,
critics rejected her conflation of Korean and Japanese comfort women as
sharing a similar imperial experience. Such a conflation, they charged,
wholly failed to take into account the basic discrimination based on
ethnicity that lay at the heart of Japan’s colonial enterprise.

In November 2015, five months after the filing of the civil and crimi-
nal cases against Professor Park, South Korean prosecutors criminally
indicted her for libel—a decision that was swiftly met with a public
petition of protest by fifty-four prominent academics and intellectuals
(Japanese and American, in the main) who decried what they viewed as
state trespass on academic freedom. Activists such as Professor Kim Puja
of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, however, judged not academic
freedom to be the main issue at stake, but rather getting the facts right.
“Historical interpretation might be a matter of academic freedom,” she
asserted at a November 2015 symposium sponsored by VAWW-RAC,
“but at issue in this case is whether or not the book contains falsehoods.”5
For its part, VAWW-RAC prepared booklets and educational materials
addressing what they believed to be common mistaken assumptions
regarding the comfort women system.

Then, in January 2016, Park Yuha was found guilty by Seoul’s Eastern
District court on charges of defamation against the surviving comfort
women. The same court ordered her employer, Sejong University, to
withhold a portion of her wages until she paid compensation (ten million
won apiece) to the nine plaintiffs.

The Conservative Turn and the Debate Today
Japan under the second Shinzō Abe administration has shown a decid-
edly conservative ideological orientation in its approach to how Japan’s
twentieth century experience ought to be remembered and taught. The
nationalist lobbying group, Nippon Kaigi, or “Japan Conference” which
has grown in stature and power since the start of the first Abe administration in 2006, is at the very center of the conservative turn in Japan’s national politics. Today, over three quarters of Abe’s cabinet members belong to Nippon Kaigi, with Abe himself serving as a “special advisor.” The predominance of cabinet members belonging to the organization—even in 2007 during Abe’s first administration—led one commentator to name the trend a “cabinet-jack,” to suggest a hijacking by sinister forces. Members of Abe’s conservative cabinet are also amply represented in Diet caucus groups with strong nationalist orientations such as the Association of Diet Members Concerned with Japan’s Future and History Education. These cabinet members exert real influence on the ways in which the comfort women issue is communicated to schoolchildren and members of the general public. In April 2011, Abe himself communicated the passion of his conviction that the issue be removed from school textbooks. Speaking as a member of the opposition party, Abe angrily questioned officials from the Ministry of Education as to why, though they had removed mention of the comfort women system from junior high school textbooks, it had been included in a high school textbook where it was characterized as an example of forced labor. In February 2013, Abe reiterated his insistence that there was no government order ever issued authorizing the recruitment or management of the comfort women system. In May of the same year, Osaka mayor Tōru Hashimoto’s declaration that the comfort women system was “necessary” was the first of a wave of declarations by public officials and media, seemingly intent on shifting the discourse away from reconciliation and towards a triumphant nationalism. Summer 2013 saw, too, an uptick in so-called kenkanbon, or “hate Korea” books as well as anti-Korean graffiti and demonstrations in Zainichi neighborhoods in Tokyo (Shin-Ōkubo) and Osaka (Tsuruhashi). Users on right-wing social media sites resurrected the colonial-era pejorative futei Senjin, or “treacherous Koreans,” while conservative media outlets brayed for the retraction of the 1993 Kōno Statement.
Public doubt surrounding the veracity of first-person testimony on the comfort women issue reached an apex in August 2014 when the Asahi Shimbun declared the Yoshida Seiji Testimony—a first-person account that the paper ran in the 1980s and ’90s featuring the experiences of a former imperial army soldier in the alleged forced recruitment of young Korean women on the island of Jeju in the last years of the war—to be a fabrication. The Asahi retraction fed the flames of so-called “comfort women bashing” (ianfu bashingu) which continues today. Most recently, the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM), which coordinates activities aimed at heightening awareness of the comfort women issue, received its first bomb threat in eleven years of operation. On October 5, 2016, the nonprofit organization received a postcard at its Tokyo headquarters from the far-right-group, Asahi Sekihotai, warning: “We will bomb you. Take down your war exhibits.”

By contrast, civil society in South Korea has redoubled its efforts to keep the comfort women a vital part of the national narrative. School-age children are given regular instruction on the comfort women issue, with separate workbooks prepared for elementary, middle, and high school students. Popular culture has similarly maintained a close focus on the issue. 2015 saw two feature-length films by Korean production companies on the comfort women. The first, Spirits’ Homecoming (Director Cho Jung-Rae) about the kidnapping of two young girls by Japanese imperial army soldiers for work in a comfort station topped the Korean box office in February 2016. The second, The Last Tear (Director Christopher H. K. Lee), a documentary, won honors for Best Feature at the World Humanitarian Awards. The globalization of Korean efforts to validate the comfort women and the testimony can be seen also in the March 2016 action by the Los Angeles city council and its public recognition of the efforts of eighty-eight-year-old former comfort woman Lee Yong-soo in resisting attempts to erase the memory of the comfort women from the historical record.
What has been the effect on young people of the conservative turn in Japan regarding the comfort women issue? How sharp is the contrast in attitudes between university-age peers in South Korea and Japan regarding this most thorny issue in their bilateral alliance? A survey conducted between July and December 2013 of 3,000 university students in Japan and 1,000 of their peers in South Korea reveals a basic common understanding that the recruitment of comfort women involved force and or trickery by the imperial Japanese army.\(^9\) A basic discrepancy separating the two groups of respondents concerns the appropriate response by the Japanese government. Fewer than a third of Japanese respondents favored an apology and financial compensation, while a full 98 percent of Korean respondents viewed such action as the best course.\(^10\)

Let the debate between opposing sides continue. Let historians and journalists continue to argue about the use of sources and analytic frames for understanding sexual violence in zones of conflict. Let us be reminded of the impossibility of history. Let former soldiers and former comfort women record testimonies of their experiences, and let filmmakers inscribe these stories in popular consciousness. Let monuments be raised to commemorate the horrible violence of war. Let diplomats restore relations and improvise new outlets and venues for more informed citizens to join the debate. Let all these things happen. Just don’t let discussion (and indeed disagreement) yield to silence.

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**Chapter Endnotes**

1. For a chronicling of government responses (both Japanese and Korean) to the comfort women issue throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, see Gabriel Jonsson, “Can the Japan-Korea Dispute on ‘Comfort Women’ be Resolved?” *Korea Observer* 46.3 (Autumn 2015): 489–515.

2. The number of comfort women varied widely. Some claim 200,000, others an order of magnitude lower (or about 20,000).
6. The comment was by Yoshifumi Tawara. VAWW/RAC, November 2014, p. 3.
8. Japanese director Doi Toshikuni, whose previous documentary features were on the Israel/Palestinian conflict, also made a documentary on the comfort women in 2015. Entitled ‘Kioku’ to ikiru, it features interviews with residents of Nanumul Jip (then located in Seoul) that Doi conducted between 1994 and 1997.
9. Interestingly, researchers charted gender discrepancies in answers, noting that of the approximately 1,000 Japanese respondents who believed that the comfort women went voluntarily to the comfort stations and therefore should be regarded as having participated in a form of licensed prostitution, 560 were men. In the Korean case, the overwhelming majority of the 1,000 respondents declared force and trickery to have been behind recruitment. VAWW/RAC, December 2014, p. 11–12.
Abductees in South Korea and Japan: Enhancing Trilateral Cooperation

Gene Park

Executive Summary

As the North Korean threat has grown, so has the case for greater cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Observers have noted, and in some cases bemoaned, the lingering historical hostility that prevents more robust cooperation. Despite the emphasis on their historical differences, both countries share a tragic experience: the abduction of nationals by the North Korean regime. Unfortunately, the issue has not promoted common purpose and resolve. Instead, the failure to coordinate on this issue has hindered diplomacy without enhancing the chances of a resolution to this tragic issue. By increasing governmental and civic cooperation, Japan and South Korea as well as the U.S. can build trust, deepen ties, and recognize common values while at the same time enhancing the effectiveness of their diplomacy.
Introduction

With the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (hereafter North Korea) fifth nuclear test in 2016 and ongoing missile development, the case for a coordinated policy response is stronger than ever. These developments pose the most direct threat to the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea), Japan, and the U.S., and accordingly the countries have moved, albeit slowly, toward greater strategic cooperation. One impediment to cooperation though has been the fraught relationship between Japan and South Korea, which continue to grapple with lingering historical animosities relating to Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula. Yet despite a recent low point in their relationship,¹ both Japanese and South Korean leaders increasingly realize the importance of increased cooperation, as witnessed by the signing of a new bilateral intelligence agreement in November 2016.

To cultivate deeper cooperation, this paper suggests that both South Korea and Japan take measures to coordinate around another issue common to both countries: addressing the abduction of their nationals by the North Korean regime. Thus far, both countries have largely taken a go-it-alone approach to resolving this problem. Weak coordination has allowed the North Korean government to exploit the issue to its advantage, which at times has complicated diplomacy (such as during the Six-Party Talks discussed below) while producing few tangible results. Rather than going it alone, both Japan and South Korea would benefit from closer cooperation on the issue. Working together would highlight their common interest in dealing with the human rights violations of the North Korean regime, which would enhance trust among elites and the public of both countries. By focusing on the issue as one common to both countries, international cooperation could distance the issue, which has broad resonance in Japan, from the right wing and fringe anti-Korean sentiment. Lastly, while a full resolution is arguably unlikely, closer coordination on the issue is more likely to produce better results and enhance the ability of the U.S., South Korea and Japan to address broader strategic objectives.
A Shared Tragedy: Abductions in South Korea and Japan

North Korea has kidnapped thousands of citizens of other countries since the end of the Korean War in 1953. The regime had a range of apparent motives, including acquiring foreign identities for their spies, instructing North Koreans in foreign languages, and for use in propaganda. Of these, the largest number of abductees—estimated to be near four thousand—was from South Korea. The majority of those abducted were returned to South Korea, several escaped, but 516 of them are still missing. How many are still alive is unclear. The Japanese government’s official estimate of the number of its abductees is seventeen, the second highest number of abductees. Of these, North Korea claims eight are dead. The remaining five returned to Japan in 2002, and later five of their children were brought to Japan as well.²

South Korea

In South Korea, its abductees emerged as a political issue in the late 1990s. In 1998, one abductee escaped and returned to South Korea, increasing the visibility of their plight. As momentum grew around this issue, families of abductees and their supporters began to seek redress, not only for the abductions, but also for the discrimination that many family members of abductees faced as a result of suspected communist sympathies.³ Advocacy groups pressed the government to do more to resolve the issue of the abductees, and in 2011, the government established the Abductees Committee headed by the Vice-Minister of Unification.

Still, the issue of abductees has been far less prominent than in Japan due to other major unresolved issues, including POWs remaining in the North from the Korean War (1950 to 1953) and over 100,000 families that remain separated from the division of the Korean Peninsula. Prior to the second North-South Summit in 2007, one poll asked South Koreans to list the top priority for the summit, revealing that abductions were perceived to be the lowest priority - nuclear weapons was the top priority followed...
by easing military tension. The government has subordinated the issue to other larger foreign policy priorities, such as former President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, to improve inter-Korean relations and more recently, pressuring North Korea to end provocations and its nuclear program. The South Korean government though has used the UN to raise awareness about the abductee issue and other North Korean human rights abuses.

**Japan**

The Japanese government’s approach to the abductee issue has been driven by domestic politics. The issue of abductees came into full public view in 2002 when Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang as a step toward normalization. During this historic visit, Kim Jong Il acknowledged and expressed remorse to Koizumi that North Korea had abducted thirteen Japanese nationals, reporting that five were still alive and eight had died. There had long been suspicions of abductions, but the spontaneous revelation sparked a public backlash, which ultimately led to the derailment of normalization talks.

In the aftermath of the revelation, the outrage increased when the evidence provided by North Korea to verify the deaths proved dubious. In contrast to South Korea, the issue of abductees rose to the top of the political agenda. Indeed, a poll right after the 2002 Pyongyang Summit showed that the Japanese had much greater interest in the abductee issue than North Korea’s nuclear program, a pattern that has persisted in subsequent years. Shinzo Abe, who as Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary had openly broken ranks with him over the issue, rose to power in 2006 in part by taking a hard-line stance. Prime Minister Abe declared that the issue of abductions was “the most important problem our country faces” and then formed The Headquarters on the Abduction Issue, which he personally chaired. Upon coming back to power at the end of 2012, Prime Minister Abe promised resolution of the issue during his tenure in office.
Since the official acknowledgement that North Korea had kidnapped Japanese citizens, the Japanese government has taken a variety of measures—including a series of carrots and sticks—to seek a resolution to the issue. The Japanese government has held out normalization and the promise of aid to entice the North Korean regime into a satisfactory resolution. It has also employed unilateral sanctions against North Korea and advocated at different times for a widening of sanctions. The Japanese government has also used other multilateral fora to advance its case, including the UN.

**Why Broader Coordination is Needed**

Thus far, there has been limited cooperation on the issue of the abductees, and at times, the governments of South Korea, Japan and the U.S. have been at odds. There are good reasons though that these countries, in particular Japan and South Korea, should pursue enhanced cooperation. First, the lack of cooperation hinders diplomatic coordination. From 2003 to 2008, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. held the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear program. During these negotiations, the failure to coordinate positions on the abductee issue created opportunities for North Korea to create a wedge between natural allies—the U.S., South Korea and Japan. The Japanese side understandably pushed for a resolution of the abduction issue, but North Korea used the issue to isolate Japan. The Japanese government refused to provide aid as part of a deal for denuclearization, but the other parties went forward with the deal. Tension between the U.S. and Japan also emerged when the U.S. dropped North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terror, despite previous indication that delisting North Korea would be contingent on progress on the abductee issue.8

Despite this experience, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have yet to figure out an effective way both to address the issue of abductees and pursue a coordinated approach to North Korea. The Japanese side, even under the hawkish current Prime Minister Abe, has pursued an
independent approach focused on normalization and the settlement of the abductee issue. As recently as May 2014, the Abe government lifted some sanctions, although sanctions were stiffened in the wake of additional nuclear tests. At times, these negotiations have surprised both South Korea and the U.S. When Prime Minister Abe sent a special adviser to Pyongyang in May 2013 to discuss the abduction issue, neither the South Korean nor the U.S. governments had received notification. Indeed, one South Korean official described the move as “not helpful” and urged a united front between all three countries.9

Second, it is unlikely that the lack of coordination is likely to have an upside. From the perspective of the Japanese government and people, one can fully appreciate the desire to settle this painful issue. It is also not surprising that the Japanese government has pursued an independent policy to seek a resolution; indeed, the U.S. has not always been as sympathetic to the Japanese side or fully appreciated the domestic pressure on the government to do something about it. Yet at the same time, the prospects of Japan successfully resolving this issue bilaterally are quite dim. On the one hand, even if North Korea made a good faith effort to normalize relations, Japan faces constraints in terms of the carrot that it might offer. Restoring trade relations and providing aid would come up against Japanese security interests in pressuring the North Korean regime to slow or freeze its nuclear and missile development. On the other hand, there is little strategic incentive for North Korea to negotiate in good faith to resolve the issue given its utility as an issue that it can manipulate to its advantage.

Third, by failing to coordinate, Japan and South Korea are missing an opportunity to build trust and articulate a common interest amongst themselves. Despite the fact that both South Korean and Japanese nationals have been abducted, the issue has provided little sense of solidarity. In fact, in some ways the abductions have undermined goodwill between the countries. In Japan, there is widespread outrage toward North Korea,
but elements of the right wing—such as the activist group National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea—have exploited this issue. The kidnappings have also fed fringe anti-Korean sentiment in Japan. Protestors have publicly directed hate speech and threats toward Koreans, a development that damages the image of Japanese among South Koreans.

A Path Forward

There are two areas where cooperation can be enhanced. First, the government and civic groups should emphasize the common plight of the victims in Japan and South Korea. South Korea has more abductees, but the issue has been a relatively low priority. In Japan the issue has largely been framed as a Japanese-specific tragedy. Steps to emphasize a shared experience can raise the visibility of the issue in South Korea. Such measures may increase South Korean awareness of the broad resonance of the issue in Japan and increase recognition that it is more than just a rallying cry for the right wing. Cross-national cooperation could also help dilute the influence of right wing and fringe anti-Korean protesters in shaping the narrative in Japan.

Second, regular dialogues should be held to foster cooperation on the abductee issue. Given different priorities and varying democratic pressures, there are limitations to the extent to which policies can be aligned. Still, bilateral meetings between South Korea and Japan can provide an opportunity to share information, discuss standards for what would constitute a satisfactory North Korean response, and coordinate policy responses so as to avoid surprises or limit opportunities for North Korea exploitation. Trilateral dialogue with the U.S. also would improve coordination of policy responses. Regular meetings might add consistency to the United States’ messaging to its partners and also help avoid policy shifts that undermine trust.
Chapter Endnotes

1. The heads of state from both countries did not meet between 2012 and November 2015.


3. Ibid.


5. This included remains the North Korean regime sent of Yokota Megumi, who had been abducted at age thirteen. The Japanese side argues that DNA tests indicated that the remains were not those of Megumi although this conclusion itself has been controversial.


Executive Summary

This essay explores the problem of trust in Korea-Japan relations and offers practical steps towards trust-building in bilateral relations. Disaggregating state from society, I find that government officials and elite policymakers assess the trustworthiness of their counterparts through a strategic understanding of trust based on common interests and reciprocity. The domestic public, however, assesses the trustworthiness of the other nation based on a “non-rational” understanding of trust informed by strong in-group/out-group biases, thus complicating the ability of policy leaders to overcome any trust gap at the inter-state level. After assessing recent examples of these two different dimensions of trust in Korea-Japan relations, I offer suggestions for improving trust, particularly at the societal level.

On December 28, 2015, the governments of Japan and South Korea (hereafter Korea) announced breaking news on a deal which would “irrevocably” put to rest the controversy over the use of Korean “comfort women” during World War II by the Japanese military. Yet rather than celebrate what was hailed as a landmark agreement, South Koreans,
and to a lesser extent some Japanese, reacted to the agreement with sharp criticism. Although Korea-Japan relations have improved since the comfort women agreement, particularly in light of North Korean provocations in 2016, Korea-Japan relations periodically complicate U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateralism and efforts to bring lasting peace in Northeast Asia.

This essay explores the problem of trust in Korea-Japan relations and how policymakers might strengthen bilateral relations. Disaggregating state from society, I find that government officials and elite policymakers assess the trustworthiness of their counterparts through a strategic understanding of trust based on common interests and reciprocity. The domestic public, however, assesses the trustworthiness of the other nation based on a “non-rational” understanding of trust informed by strong in-group/out-group biases, often leading to virulent nationalism. State leaders may at the margins trust one another based on repeated interaction over time. But their respective societies, that is the wider masses, may be less trusting of the other side, thus complicating the ability of policy leaders to overcome any trust gap at the inter-state level.

My essay proceeds in three sections. First, I provide general reasons leading to the trust vacuum in Northeast Asia. Next, I turn to Korea-Japan relations, the most puzzling case of (mis)trust in Northeast Asia, and elaborate on the two dimensions of trust confronted by policymakers at the inter-state and societal level. The final section suggests how trust might be rebuilt, putting greater emphasis at the societal level.

Two Dimensions of Trust in Korea-Japan Relations

Although no major conflict has erupted in post-cold war Asia, mistrust permeates across the three major Northeast Asian actors: China, Japan, Korea. However, I focus on the least likely dyad for mistrust: Korea and Japan. According to standard international relations theory, Korea
and Japan should have cast aside historical enmity years ago, resulting in deeper trust and more cooperative relations. One would expect two economically advanced, liberal democracies closely aligned to the United States and marked by relatively high degrees of economic interdependence to be more trusting of the other. Yet since the normalization of relations in 1965, Korea-Japan relations have swung between friction and limited cooperation. If Japan-South Korea relations reached their apex in the late 1990s following a series of reconciliation measures between the two countries, the period from 2012 to 2015 hit a low point with no official bilateral meeting among the top leaders of Japan and South Korea for nearly three years.¹

As much as Korean and Japanese leaders have been brandished as myopic in their dealings with each another, neither side can be faulted for not having tried to make conciliatory gestures. Recognizing mutual gains to cooperation, both Korean and Japanese policymakers have carefully (and at times secretly) taken steps to negotiate agreements, despite potential risks and uncertainty involved in making such deals. To this end, a great deal of interaction between the two countries has taken place through lower level and backdoor channels. In an ideal world of diplomacy where states are only accountable to one other, and not domestic public opinion, political leaders can begin to take steps towards cooperation which might gradually increase trust.

Unfortunately, international diplomacy is often a “two-level game” in which policymakers must not only confront their foreign counterparts, but also their own domestic polities.² The beliefs of policymakers may of course be influenced by public opinion, or reflect broader national sentiments. But where policymakers are more likely to interact with their foreign counterparts on the basis of strategic trust, the mass public may perceive the trustworthiness of the other nation (and its actions) through a non-rational, dispositional notion of trust. Trust in this sense is “the product of particular identity relationships that develop over time.”³
The consequence of diplomacy playing across two different dimensions is that even if Korean and Japanese policymakers make incremental steps in improving government relations following the logic of strategic trust, their efforts are constrained if distrust towards the other nation at the societal level persists. The prospect for advancing a virtuous cycle of trust and developing strong bilateral relations is most likely when policymakers exhibit sufficient trust to advance projects/policies for mutual gain under a favorable domestic climate (i.e., when public opinion also expresses more favorable attitudes towards the other). Under such conditions, societal interests are less likely to hijack government initiatives intended to bolster reciprocity and positive exchanges between two states. However, when societal levels of trust towards the other nation are low, the trust gap persists. Perhaps the worst situation is when political leaders exploit mistrust at the societal level for their own political gain. Both South Korean and Japanese actors at times have played the nationalist card to advance domestic and foreign policy goals.

Two relatively recent examples—the eleventh-hour collapse of the ROK-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) agreement in June 2012, and the comfort women agreement addressed in December 2015—demonstrate why relations between Korea and Japan remain mired in distrust despite efforts by policymakers to take steps to build trust and promote cooperation.

In the GSOMIA case, Tokyo and Seoul secretly negotiated an information and intelligence sharing agreement. Once revealed, however, the opposition progressive party heavily criticized the deal for not making the negotiations transparent. The scrapped agreement only fueled growing Japanese exasperation towards Korea. “Korea fatigue” expanded the nationalist narrative that Koreans would never be able to get past the “Japan problem” regardless of countless apologies from the Japanese government. Although the two governments eventually signed the information-sharing agreement in late 2016, its passage in the National Assembly (as of this writing) is not assured. Opposition from civil societal
groups and politicians was captured by a Minjoo Party Leader spokesman stating, “GSOMIA is the product of disgraceful and unpatriotic negotiations that the public does not accept.”

On the comfort woman issue, Korean activists launched a mass campaign criticizing the ruling party for having made the agreement without consulting any of the surviving comfort woman. Public reactions were not as negative in Japan as in South Korea. However, right-wing Japanese groups argued that the Abe government had capitulated to Koreans.

One might argue that in both cases, public backlash in Korea, and to a lesser extent Japan, was triggered more by distrust towards one’s own government than distrust towards Japan or Korea, respectively. In fact, much of the criticism from South Korean civil society on the comfort woman issue was directed towards the Park government rather than Japan directly for “selling out” surviving comfort women victims. And in the GSOMIA case, civil societal groups were as critical of the Lee government for “kowtowing” to the United States and antagonizing China. Nevertheless, the fact that domestic groups managed to quickly mobilize on Japan/Korea-related issues, whether for political reasons led by opposition parties, or out of genuine antagonism towards Japan/Korea, suggests that mistrust towards the other nation exists at a level widespread enough to foment national opposition.

Rebuilding Trust in Korea-Japan Relations

Any effort at trust-building requires the involvement and will power of leaders and their respective societies. Bottom-up or top-down approaches alone are insufficient in producing inter-state cooperation. And while some have put the onus on leaders to pursue short-term political and diplomatic initiatives, without wider political support such initiatives are doomed to fail, as suggested by recent attempts to pursue inter-governmental cooperation. Sufficient shared interest exists to incentivize policymakers to promote and develop greater strategic trust. What has
always lagged behind, thus stymieing more robust cooperation from taking off, has been a lack of trust rooted in identity between Japanese and Korean society. My focus therefore turns to measures of trust-building at the societal level.

Both President Park and Prime Minister Abe used the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the normalization of Korea-Japan relations to renew a process of trust-building which led to their first summit in November 2015. What steps might be taken to support such processes? Japanese and Korean society must first exhibit some general level of trust towards the other for state-led initiatives to take effect. Greater effort at public diplomacy is needed from both Tokyo and Seoul to counter anti-Korea sentiment on the Japanese right, and anti-Japanese sentiment from the general Korean population. For instance, to win allies and broader support among the Korean public, Japanese officials could play to the Korean media on a range of issues (trade, diplomacy, security, environment, and entertainment) which directly or tangentially benefit Korea-Japan relations.5 Academics and civil societal groups must also work to check nationalist passions from right-wing (and in Korea some left-wing) political groups, and discredit sweeping generalizations if not outright distortion of information generated by the media. Seoul and Tokyo can also do more to promote study tours and exchange programs which cultivate the next generation of Korea-Japan policy leaders as both countries currently do to promote U.S-Korea and U.S.-Japan relations, respectively.

Conflict over history must also be managed and mitigated to prevent historical issues from derailing other areas of ongoing political and economic cooperation. Politicians should refrain from demanding immediate resolutions on historical issues which require incremental steps. Additionally, politicians should exercise greater restraint in using Japan-Korean issues as a whip to lash out against their own ruling government as opposition parties in South Korea did in 2012 and again in 2016 with the GSOMIA.
While historical interpretation is never purely objective, Koreans and Japanese should take into consideration the perceptions of the other side. For instance, Koreans may not consider how Japan’s own total destruction at the end of World War II coming from months of allied bombing followed by the devastation of nuclear weapons shaped Japan’s own narrative of victimhood, making Japanese society more reluctant to address their own victimization of Korea. Likewise, in Japan, an insufficient understanding of Japan’s colonial domination of Korea, particularly its cultural and psychological dimensions, may make it altogether easy for Japanese society to dismiss Korean grievances. Although educators and civil societal groups in both countries have come together to address these thorny issues in hopes of reaching some mutual understanding, such efforts need to be promoted by both countries’ respective ministries of education, ideally through recognition in textbooks adopted in the public education system.

Rather than only dwelling on the colonial past, Koreans and Japanese should also highlight instances of peace and exchange initiated since 1965 and take stock of what worked and did not work in facilitating trust. Governments must stress to the wider public the progress which has been made on Korea-Japan relations the past three decades. In particular, Koreans should recognize that a slow convergence of historical perceptions has taken place over time, moving in a direction closer to the Korean position rather than in reverse.

Finally, Seoul and Tokyo should build on momentum generated by North Korean provocations to enhance cooperation and build trust (such as current negotiations for concluding a bilateral GSOMIA). Furthermore, both governments should disseminate a long-term strategic vision of Korea-Japan relations emphasizing cooperation for the future. As Prime Minister Abe remarked at a reception hosted by the Korean embassy in Tokyo “Let us build a new era for our two countries together, while looking back at the 50 years of history of friendship and development and looking forward at the next 50 years.” Seoul and Tokyo might build
a specific roadmap towards enhanced cooperation to give Korea-Japan relations shape and direction. Having such a roadmap may help cooler heads prevail in the event that historical tensions flare up and remind both leaders what the costs are for attempting to capitalize on anti-Korean or anti-Japanese nationalism.

Chapter Endnotes

1. Reasons for the downturn in bilateral relations include President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Dokdo/Takeshima in August 2012; the re-emergence of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to power in late 2012 and his personal position on past historical issues; and President Park Geun-hye’s admonition of Japan to adopt a “correct understanding” of its past.


5. This was a tactic the U.S. delegation geared towards the Japanese media in an attempt to sway Japanese domestic politics in their favor during the Structural Impediments Initiative negotiations in the 1990s. See Leonard J. Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

6. For instance, the Northeast Asian History Foundation (NAHF) based in Seoul has organized conferences with Japanese scholars to discuss contentious historical issues. However, the agenda of NAHF is still perceived as one focused on promoting South Korean interpretations of history.


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Emma Chanlett-Avery is a Specialist in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS). She focuses on security issues in the region, including U.S. relations with Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Thailand, and Singapore. Ms. Chanlett-Avery joined CRS in 2003 through the Presidential Management Fellowship, with rotations in the State Department on the Korea Desk and at the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Bangkok, Thailand. She also worked in the Office of Policy Planning as a Harold Rosenthal Fellow. She is a member of the Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Japan Network for the Future, a board member for the Japan America Society of Washington, and the 2016 recipient of the Kato Prize. Professional and academic fellowships include the Amherst-Doshisha Fellowship, the Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship in advanced Japanese, the American Assembly Next Generation Fellowship, and a U.S. Speaker and Specialist Grant from the U.S. Department of State. Ms. Chanlett-Avery received an MA in international security policy from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and her BA in Russian studies from Amherst College.

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