Please visit The Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program page for more information.

For the online application and more information, please visit the Application and Selection Guide page.

The last information session before the deadline is March 7, 2012 from 12pm – 1pm (EST).  For the complete schedule, please click here.

For any questions and concerns not covered in web pages, please contact Mr. Sam Dundon, Program Associate, Mansfield Fellowship Program at (202) 347-1994 or sdundon -at- mansfieldfdn dot org.

KORUS as Obamacare: Implications of Calls by Korea’s Opposition Parties to Repeal the Korea US-Free Trade Agreement

by L. Gordon Flake

Explaining US domestic politics to international audiences is never easy. It is particularly difficult during election years.  The proposal to grant US statehood to colonies on the moon is hardly the most outlandish proposal to emerge from the ongoing primary contest. Such statements should be taken with a grain of salt as they will presumably be moderated as candidates move to the middle for the general elections and, if elected, face the realities of governance. As South Korea’s own vibrant democracy gears up for general elections in April and a presidential election in December, political parties are similarly seeking to distinguish themselves. While it is important for US observers to place such pre-election posturing in context, one recent pledge by South Korea’s main opposition parties is particularly dangerous, shortsighted, and unrealistic.

On Feb. 8 the Democratic United Party (DUP) and the Unified Progressive Party (UPP) held a joint press conference and read out a letter signed by 96 opposition lawmakers and delivered to President Obama and other US leaders through the US Embassy in Seoul. The letter threatens that “If we win the presidential election and if our demands for renegotiations are not met by that time, the KORUS FTA will be terminated by Clause 2, Article 24.5 of the agreement.” (Article 24.5 states, “This Agreement shall terminate 180 days after the date either Party notifies the other Party in writing that it wishes to terminate the Agreement.”)

Currently, opposition to KORUS centers around 10 provisions in the agreement that have been termed “poisonous” even though nine of the 10 were negotiated by the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration and despite the fact that the most sensitive provision on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISD) is included in nearly all other ROK trade agreements, including one with the European Union.  Opposition concerns over the process of ratification and certain provisions of KORUS are understandable and US and South Korean officials should be able to discuss and address such concerns in the normal course of diplomacy. But when senior leaders such as Democratic United Party Chairwoman Han Myeong-sook — who was prime minister when the deal was negotiated — calls KORUS a “treacherous deal” there is a danger that what is a domestic political issue in Seoul will negatively impact US-ROK relations.

KORUS was broadly supported by Asia specialists, government officials with responsibility for Asia, and business leaders across the political spectrum in the US. Its ratification in both Seoul and Washington was the product of considerable effort over the course of five years, overcoming numerous economic and political challenges. In the end, KORUS was rightly viewed as more than just a trade deal.  It was and is a strategic agreement intended to strengthen and deepen the US-ROK relationship. For the opposition in Korea to lead with a pledge to “take every measure possible to repeal” KORUS is a clear indication that they do not understand or do not value the strategic importance of the deal. While critics may think that opposition to KORUS is good politics — similar to Republican pledges to repeal what they call Obamacare — their sweeping and hyperbolic denunciations risk being interpreted as anti-American. Is this the perception that leaders of a potential new government in Korea wish to give to the individuals and institutions most committed to US-Korea relations? And remember it is precisely those individuals and institutions who were most vested in KORUS as a strategic initiative that will provide the primary prism through which a new government in Korea will be viewed.

Whatever their motivations, opponents of KORUS are likely overestimating their leverage: there is almost no appetite or political capacity to re-open negotiations in Washington.  In October 2011, the United States had a strategic mandate to move forward with KORUS. Then, failure to ratify an agreement of this quality with an ally as close as South Korea would have undercut the US position in APEC, prospects for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade Negotiations, and US credibility in the East Asia Summit and the region more broadly. But, the US has now ratified KORUS. Regardless of whether the ROK decides to back out, the US strategic mandate and its credibility in leading a trade and investment liberalization agenda in Asia have been secured. Moreover, the primary impact of withdrawal would fall on Korea: there would be real economic costs and missed opportunities for the ROK as well as damage to its soft power, since Seoul has never before repealed an international treaty; To do so would cause the ROK’s international position and reputation to suffer.

While opposition to KORUS may prove to be political posturing, the effort to repeal the deal will have the immediate impact of limiting the ROK’s prospects to join negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Not only are ROK officials unlikely to take on the added challenges of TPP negotiations in the current environment, but it is hard to imagine other members of the TPP being interested in including South Korea if it is attempting to repeal a similar trade deal with the United States. As a nation deeply dependent on international trade, the ROK has played a key role in recent years in promoting international trade and investment liberalization. Not only has the ROK been a leader in the G20, but having successfully negotiated and ratified in KORUS a prototype for the “21^st Century” free trade agreement envisioned by the TPP, the ROK could be a leading voice for further trade and investment liberalization in the region. Repeal deprives the US and the ROK of a positive narrative and an area of close cooperation in the international arena.

The successful negotiation of the KORUS free trade agreement was one of the signature accomplishments of the Roh Moo-hyun administration. Despite political strains in the alliance and very real differences between US and ROK approaches to North Korea, the fact that our two nations could agree upon such a significant and mutually beneficial agreement served as evidence of our shared interests and strategy. It is a shame that in an effort to reclaim the legacy of President Roh the current generation of opposition leaders in South Korea is jeopardizing that very accomplishment.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed.

Please note this event is hosted by East-West Center and is not a Mansfield Foundation event.

For more information and instructions to RSVP, please see the flier to the event here.

Matthew Poggi (Mansfield Fellow 2009-2011, U.S. Department of Treasury) and Kouhei Otsuka, member of Japan’s House of Councilors and former DPJ senior vice minister, have written a book in which they engage in a broad debate on many of the key contemporary political and economic issues confronting Japan and the United States, as well as several challenges faced by the international community. Looking back more than thirty years, the two discuss: how Japan never was able to achieve “number one” status; Japan’s “lost decade;” and the more recent popular call for “change” in both Japan and the United States. They also examine the rise of the so-called BRICs economies, the growing leadership role of the G-20 and its likely impact on the two countries and their partnership.

The former central bankers look for lessons in the monetary and fiscal policy choices made before and after Japan’s collapsed asset price bubble to help frame an evaluation of the build-up and response to the most recent global financial crisis. Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and financial instability in Europe, the authors assess the prospects for the Japanese, U.S. and global economy.

More information on the book can be found here:

Maruzen Publishing

Amazon.jp

(This article was originally published in The New York Times on February 5, 2012)

Fifty years ago Monday, in a Waseda University auditorium in Tokyo, someone pulled the plug on Robert Kennedy’s microphone. The attorney general had come to Japan to repair the U.S.-Japan alliance in the wake of a major crisis two years before. That crisis, and Kennedy’s trip to Japan, hold important lessons for today’s problems in the alliance, and indeed for U.S. alliance relationships all over the world.

The 1960 security treaty crisis nearly killed the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Japanese were dismayed by what they saw as American support for rightist politicians, frightened by the risk of entanglement in nuclear crises, and fuming over U.S. control of Okinawa. The prime minister could only renew the treaty by ramming it through Parliament after forcibly removing the opposition from the building. Waves of protests rocked Tokyo; a shocked Washington canceled a scheduled presidential visit out of concern for the president’s safety.

Leaders on both sides, alarmed by the precariousness of their relationship, subsequently sought to repair the alliance. President John F. Kennedy tapped Edwin O. Reischauer, a respected Harvard scholar, as ambassador to Japan. Together with his accomplished Japanese wife, Haru, Reischauer transformed the isolated and imperious U.S. Embassy into a force for bilateral understanding and respect.

Reischauer decried the Americans’ lingering “occupation mentality,” and advocated an equal partnership with their ally. He worried that growing Japanese nationalism and anger over Okinawa would someday torpedo the alliance, and argued with U.S. military and Kennedy administration officials to return the island to Japan.

Kennedy also sent his most trusted adviser, his brother Robert, to visit Japan to repair bilateral ties. The attorney general rejected the usual courtesy calls and photo ops. (“Nothing of substance,” he dismissed, “ever happens at a state dinner.”) He debated Socialist officials, met with union and labor leaders, toured farms and factories, visited elementary schools, talked to university students, met with women’s groups, and watched sumo and judo demonstrations. He and his wife, Ethel, delighted crowds with their formidable star power and their friendliness.

On Feb. 6, the Waseda University auditorium writhed with crowds and noise. The pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese groups shouted at the attorney general and the Kennedy supporters yelled back at them. But Kennedy was unfazed, looking at a particularly agitated student in a thicket of Marxists. He suggested that the student, Tachiya Yuzo, ask him a question. That, he said, is the democratic way. He then extended his hand into the sea of black-uniformed students, and pulled Tachiya onstage.

While Kennedy politely held his microphone, the young man lambasted U.S. policies, starting with Okinawa. But as Kennedy began to reply, someone disconnected his microphone. Many Japanese watching on television were aghast to see their young people shout down and silence a foreign dignitary. Pandemonium reigned in the auditorium until Reischauer, in his fluent Japanese, calmed the audience. Someone handed Kennedy a bullhorn.

Kennedy addressed the crowd, and the country, about the importance of dialogue, which, he said, was only possible in democratic societies. “He was not ruffled, or angry,” recalls Brandon Grove, a member of his staff. “He knew what he wanted to say. … He spoke from the heart about what he thought was right.”

A Waseda cheerleader then bounded onstage, saying he wanted to make amends, and led the entire auditorium in a thunderous round of the Waseda University song. The Kennedy group, crowding around their interpreter who had quickly scratched out a transliteration, joined in the singing. The night, and the visit, was a triumph.

In subsequent years, Tokyo and Washington continued in that spirit. As their military ties grew stronger, the U.S.-Japan relationship began to encompass economics, culture, technology and education. Reischauer was able to achieve his goal of returning Okinawa to Japanese control, which occurred in 1972.

The rupture and repair of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1960s yield important lessons for U.S. diplomacy. At the time of the security crisis, the alliance was precariously narrow — a military marriage of convenience between Washington and a sliver of Japan’s elite. Fifty years after Robert Kennedy’s visit, Americans should celebrate the alliance’s transformation into an enduring, multilayered relationship. At the same time, America should also learn from its previous failures.

After the Kennedy-Reischauer years, Washington still neglected to develop relationships with the Japanese opposition — something Reischauer would have lamented, and something that up-ended U.S.-Japan relations when the opposition Democratic Party of Japan came into power in 2009. Moreover, as the two countries work to resolve tensions over the U.S. military base in Okinawa, Americans should remember the critical role of listening to the concerns of ordinary Japanese people — in this case, the people of Okinawa.

More broadly, Washington should notice that an alarming number of its alliances today resemble the U.S.-Japan alliance of the 1950s. In Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudia Arabia and Yemen, Washington partners with a sliver of elites who preside over populations that revile the United States. The failure to establish broader and deeper relationships puts such alliances in jeopardy.

Five decades after the confrontation at Waseda University, Tachiya (now a real estate appraiser and a grandfather) recalls that, despite his anger at American policy at the time, he could not help but admire Robert Kennedy’s willingness to engage with his opponents. It’s possible that similar attempts to engage with America’s critics today will end in failure. But they might also end with a song — and a more enduring alliance.

Jennifer Lind is an assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College and the author of “Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics.”  She is also a U.S.-Japan Network for the Future Fellow.

Planning and Preparing for the Local-Level Disaster Response

Date:  Friday, February 17, 2012
Time:  7:00p.m. (Talk will start at 7:30p.m.)
Venue:  Temple University, Japan Campus, Azabu Hall 212/213
(access: http://www.tuj.ac.jp/maps/tokyo.html)
Speaker:  Leo Bosner, Emergency Management Specialist
Moderator:  Kyle Cleveland, Associate Director of ICAS
Admission:  Free (Open to general public)
RSVP:  icas@tuj.ac.jp

*If you RSVP you are automatically registered.  If possible, we ask you to RSVP but we always welcome participants even you do not RSVP.*RSVPを頂ければ、自動的に参加登録なさったことになります。RSVPなしでも参加できますので、直接会場へお越しください。

Outline

When disaster strikes, the first responders are local…local officials, local police & fire departments, local doctors and nurses, local businesses, local volunteers. How can these people prepare for the disaster that might someday strike their community? Based on his 28 years of experience working on Crisis Management for FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), where he helped to plan for and respond to disasters such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and terrorist incidents, Leo Bosner will offer a lecture on how local communities can strengthen their ability to respond quickly and effectively to the large disaster.  Topics covered will include:

• Why local planning is important.
• The essential concept of the All-Hazards Disaster Response Plan.
•  A typical format for a disaster response plan.
•  How to create the disaster response plan.
• The disaster response exercise.

The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation and the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership are pleased to announce the publication of “Japan Moves Forward: Views from the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future.” This publication, which is now available on the Mansfield Foundation’s website, compiles policy papers from each of the fifteen participants in the inaugural group of the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future.

The U.S.-Japan Network for the Future was launched in 2009 to identify and support American professionals who demonstrate an interest in and potential for becoming Japan specialists and policy intellectuals. The Network includes Japan specialists from several regions of the U.S. with diverse areas of expertise. Since their inaugural meeting in January 2010, the first group of Network participants has met regularly, participated in a study trip to Japan, conducted independent research, and shared their Japan expertise through opinion pieces, articles and interviews. The policy papers included in “Japan Moves Forward: Views from the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future” present their perspectives on issues related to their research and relevant to the U.S.-Japan relationship moving forward. The topics range from policy recommendations for U.S.-Japan relations to Japan’s politics and policies on energy, immigration, homelessness and trade.

The Network participants further explored these and other issues in a January 13 symposium in Washington, D.C. This symposium provided an opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion between the first group of Network participants (Cohort I) and a second group (Cohort II) of fourteen Network participants announced in November 2011. It also allowed Network participants to share their expertise and exchange views with an audience that included congressional staff and U.S. government officials as well as representatives of the press and the business, academic and nonprofit communities. Network participants also had the opportunity to pose questions to Japanese Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki, who presented an overview of Japan’s economy, society, and contributions in such areas as innovation, transportation, and reconstruction in conflict zones.

In addition to the public symposium, from January 11-13 both Cohort I and Cohort II participated in events with Japan specialists in the U.S. government and representatives from the embassy of Japan. These events were the final formal meetings for Cohort I participants, who began the two-year program in 2010, and were the first meetings for Cohort II participants, who will convene again for a week-long meeting in Washington, D.C. (June 2012); a two-day retreat in Montana (autumn 2012); a week-long Japan study trip (June 2013); and a January 2014 public symposium.

A list of Cohort I and Cohort participants, recent commentary by Network participants, and information about the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future is available at http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/dialogues/u-s-japan-network-for-the-future/

The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation is a 501(c) 3 organization that promotes understanding and cooperation in U.S.-Asia relations. Maureen and Mike Mansfield’s values, ideals and vision for U.S.-Asia relations continue through the Foundation’s exchanges, dialogues, research and educational programs, which create networks among U.S. and Asian leaders, explore the underlying issues influencing public policies, and increase awareness about the nations and peoples of Asia. The Foundation has offices in Washington, D.C.; Tokyo, Japan; and Missoula, Montana.

The Center for Global Partnership (CGP) is a part of the Japan Foundation which is a Japanese Independent Administrative Institution (Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojin). To enhance dialogue and interchange between Japanese and U.S. citizens on a wide range of issues, CGP operates grant programs as well as self-initiated projects and fellowships. CGP has offices in Tokyo, Japan and New York, New York. Please visit the website at http://www.cgp.org.

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The U.S.-Japan Network for the Future was launched in 2009 to identify and support American professionals who demonstrate an interest in and potential for becoming Japan specialists and policy intellectuals.  The policy papers included in “Japan Moves Forward: Views from the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future” present the perspectives of the first group of Network participants on a wide range of issues related to their research and relevant to the U.S.-Japan relationship moving forward.  The topics range from policy recommendations for U.S.-Japan relations to Japan’s politics and policies on energy, immigration, homelessness and trade.  The foreword is written by Dr. Susan Pharr, who is a member of the Advisory Committee for the Network.

Read flier here.

Date: Tuesday, January 31st, 2012
Time: 12:00-13:30
Venue: The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
1st Floor, Room 1A

“Common Themes Found in Long Term Energy Policy Strategies:
U.S., EU, and Japan”

Speaker : Monterey R. Gardiner, Ph. D. (Mansfield Fellow)

Moderator: Dr. Atsushi Sunami
Physical Scientist, Technology Development Manager U.S. Department of Energy
Associate Professor, Director of Science & Technology, Innovation Policy Program, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)

*Language: English
*Admission Free.
*Please bring your own lunch.
For registration and inquiries please contact Ms. Kaneda.
email: m-kaneda@grips.ac.jp
phone: 03- 6439-6037
address: 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677
http://www.grips.ac.jp/about/access.htm